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1. Introduction ' . r
Because of the complexities of physical and economic systems,'the unfolding ofmost-processes that .
we care about exhibits attributes that cannot be forecast with absolute accuracy. The immediate
implication of this uncertainty for economic agents is that many .possible outcomes are usually
associated with anyone chosen action. Thus, decision.making underuncertainty is characterized by-
rait, because typically not all possible consequences are equally desirable. Although uncertainty and
risk are ubiquitous, in agriculture they constitute'an essential feature of the production environment
A, and arguably warrant a detailed analysis.
Considerable research has been devoted'to.exploring questions connected with the effects of
uncertainty and risk in agriculture, and these efforts'have paralleled related developments in the
general economics literature. In this chapter we set out to review a number of these studies,.
especially as they relate to farm-level.production decisions.' ^To. economize on our coverage of earlier
work, and at the risk of not doing justice to some ground-breaking studies, we can refer to Dillon's
(1971) survey as a starting point. In addition to providing an exposition of expected.utility (EU)
theory, which contributed to rooting subsequent studies in modern economic analysis, that survey
provides an exhaustive account of previous studies of uncertainty and risk in,agricultural economics.
Subsequent useful compendia include Anderson, Dillon and Hardaker (1977), who consider,a
comprehensive set of applications of decision theory to agricultural production under uncertainty, and
Newbery and Stiglitz (1981), who not only provide a thorough study of .commodity price stabilization
issues, but also analyze a number of problems that are,relevant to the understanding of risk in
agriculture. . , • (
- The aforementioned contributions have been accompanied and followed by considerable research
that is relevant to our pursuit. As we undertake to provide a critical survey of these studies, we are
mindful of the subjective bias and unintended oversights that anexercise such as this inevitably
entails, a risk heightened inour case by the encompassing nature of the topic and the sheer volume of
the relevant literature. We apologize for errors of omission and commission, and we hope that our
review will nonetheless prove useful to the applied researcher.
1.1. Uncertainty and risk in agriculture
Despite the fact that any taxonomy is somewhat arbitrary, it is useful to start by outlining the main
sources of uncertainty and risk that are relevant from the point ofview of the agricultural producer.
First, there is what can be broadly defined as production uncertainty: in agriculture the amount and
quality of output that will result from a given bundle of inputs are typically not known with certainty,
i.e., the production function is stochastic. This uncertainty is due to the fact that uncontrollable
elements, such as weather, play a fundamental role in agricultural production. The effects of these
uncontrollable factors are heightened by the fact that time itselfplays a particularly important role in
agricultural production, because long production lags are dictated by the biological processes that
underlie the production of crops and the growth of animals. Although there are parallels in other
production activities, it is fair to say that production uncertainty is a quintessential feature of
agricultural production.
Price uncertainty is also a standard attribute of farming activities. Because of the biological
production lags mentioned above, production decisions have to be made far in advance of realizing,
the final product, so that the market price for the output is typically not known at the time these
decisions have to be made. Price uncertainty, of course, is all the more relevant because of the
inherent volatility of agricultural markets. Such volatility may bedue to demand fluctuations, which
are particularly important when a sizable portion ofoutput is destined for the export market.
Production uncertainty as discussed earlier, however, also contributes to price uncertainty because
price needs to adjust to clear the market; In this process some typical features of agricultural markets
(a large number of competitive producers, relatively homogeneous output, and inelastic demand) are
responsible for generating considerable price volatility, even for moderate, production shocks. .
Additional sources of uncertainty are relevant to farming, decisions when longer-term economic
problems are considered. Technological uncertainty^ associated with the evolution of production
techniques that may make qiiasi-fixed past investments obsolete, emerges as a marked feature of
agricultural production. Clearly, the randomness of new knowledge development-affects production
technologies in all sectors. What makes it perhapsmore relevant to agriculture, however, is the fact
that technological innovations here are the product of research.and development efforts carried out
elsewhere (for instance, by firms supplying inputs to agriculture), such that competitive farmers are
captive players in the process. Policy uncertainty also plays an important Tole in agriculture. Again,
economic policies have impacts on all sectors through-their effects on such things as taxes,.interest
rates, exchange rates, regulation, provision of public goods, and so on.. Yet, because agriculture in
many countries is characterized by an intricate system of government interventions, and because the .
need for changing these policy interventions in recent times has remained strong (witness the recent.
transformation of key feamres of the agricultural policy of the Uriited.States and the European Union,
or the emerging concerns about the environmental impacts of agricultural production), this source of-
uncertainty creates considerable risk for agriculturaMnvestments.
1.2. Modeling issues
Two concepts of paramount importance in economic modeling are optimization (the rational behavior
of economic agents) and equilibrium (the balancing of individual claims in a market setting). The
application'of both of these concepts raises problematic issues when uncertainty is involved., In
particular, to apply the powerful apparatus.of optimization to individual choices under uncertainty one
needs to determine what exactly is being optimized. Although a universally satisfactory answer to
this question is far from obvious, the most widely used idea is,that agents exposed to uncertainty and
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risk maximize expected utility. This paradigm represents the culmination of a research program that
dates back to Bernoulli (1738), and rests on some compelling assumptions about individual choice.
Most of the applications that we will review rely on the EU model (indeed, often some restricted
version of it), Thus, in what follows we will briefly review the EU hypothesis before we proceed
with a survey of applications. We should note, however, that despite its normative appeal, the EU
framework has recently come under intense scrutiny because of its inability to describe some features
of individual behavior under risk, and a number of generalizations of the EUmodel have been
proposed [Machina (1987); Quiggin (1993)].
Amodeling strategy that recurs in the applied literature is the distinction between uncertainty and
risk attributed toKnight (1921). According to this view, risk arises when the stochastic elements ofa
decision problem can be characterized in terms ofnumerical objective probabilities, whereas
uncertainty refers to decision settings with random outcomes that lack such objective probabilities.
With the widespread acceptance ofprobabilities as subjective beliefs. Knight's distinction between risk
and uncertainty is virtually meaningless and, like other authors [e.g., Hirshleifer and Riley (1992)].
we will ignore it here.^ Thus, the notions of uncertainty and risk are interchangeable in what
follows, although, like Robison and Barry (1987), we tend to use the word uncertainty mostly to
describe the environment in which economics decisions aremade, and the word risk to characterize
the economically relevant implications of uncertainty,
2. Decision making under uncertainty
Economic models of individual choice are necessarily rooted in the assumption of rationality on the
pan of decision makers. Perhaps the most common and widely understood such model is given by
' We should note, however, that in some cases this approach is not totally satisfactory, as illustrated
for example by the so-called Ellsberg paradox [Ellsberg (1961)].
the neoclassical theory ofconsumer choice underxertainty. The primitive assumption is that there is,
apreference ordering on commodity bundles that satisfies the consistency requirements of:
completeness and transitivity. These basic rationality postulates, coupled with the assimiption of
continuity (a hardly avoidable and basically harmless mathematical simplification), allow consumer
choices to be characterized in terms of an ordinarutility fiinction, a construct that enhances the
analytical power of the assumptions. Choice under uncertainty could be characterized within this
elementary setting, given minor modification ofthe original assumptions. •For example, as in Debreu
(1959), the standard preference ordering ofneoclassical consumption theory could be applied to state-
contingent commodity'bundles. The analysis can then proceed without refeirence to the probability of
the various states-of-nature. Whereas such an approach has proven useful for some problems [Arrow
(1964); Hirshleifer (1966)], for a number of other cases, including applications typically of interest to
agricultural economists, a more specific framework ofanalysis is desirable. By explicitly recognizing
the mutually exclusive nature of alternative random consequences, one canget a powerful
representation of decision making under uncertainty. This leads to the so-called EUmodel of
.decision under uncertainty, arguably the most important achievement of modem economic analysis of
individual behavior. Although there exist a number of lucid expositions of this model [for a textbook
treatment, see Mas-Colell, Whinston and Green (1995, chapter 6)], we present (somewhat informally)
the main features of EU theory, to set the stage for the review of applications that follows.
2.7 Preferences over lotteries and the expected utility model • j >
Let A represent the set of all possible actions available to decision makers, and let S represent the set
of all possible states of nature. The specific action chosen by the agent and the particular state of
namre that is realized (with the former choice being made prior to the resolution of uncertainty about
the true state of nature) determine the outcomes (consequences) that the agent cares about. In other
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words, consequences are random variables as given by the function c:S xA C. where Cis the set
of all possible consequences. For example, Ccould be the set of all possible commodity bundles as
in standard consumer theory, in which case C=9?^. Alternatively, as in many applications, it is
monetary outcomes that are ofinterest to the decision makers, in which case one can put C=9^.
Suppose for simplicity that the set Cis finite, and that there are possible consequences. Given an
objectively known probability for each state of nature, then choosing a particular action will result in
a probability distribution (a lottery, a gamble) over outcomes. Formally, one can define a lottery as a
probability list L = such that f ,• is the probability (likelihood) that consequence
Ci S C will arise (of course, fG [0,1] and X = !)•
In this setting, primitive preferences are represented by a preference relation i defined over the
set ofall possible lotteries i£. Assuming that this relation is rational (complete and transitive) and
satisfies a specific continuity assumption, then all lotteries can be ranked by a function in
the sense that, for any two lotteries Land L', we have ^ V(L) > V(L') . Because the underlying
assumption is that the decision maker is concerned only with the ultimate consequences, compound
lotteries in this setting are always equivalent to the corresponding reduced lottery. Thus, for-
example, a gamble that gives lottery Lwith probability Xand lottery L' with probability (1 - X) is
equivalent to asimple lottery whose probabilities are given by the mixture XL +(1 - \)L" . So far,
the parallel with standard consumer theory is quite close [in particular, for example, y{L) is an
ordinal function]. To get the EU model, a further assumption is required at this point, namely the
"independence axiom" [Samuelson (1952)]. This condition requires that, ifwe consider the mixture
of each ofany two lotteries L and L' with another lottery L'\ the preference ordering on the two
Aresulting lotteries is independent of the particular common lottery L". That is, for any L, V and L ,
and any X E (0,1), ' . - •
L >L' « XL- + (1 -X)L" iXi' + (1 - X)L". - • •
'One may note that an equivalent assumption in the standard choice problem ofconsumer theory would
be very restrictive, which is why it is seldom made in that context. Here, however, the independence
assumption is quite natural because ofa fundamental feature ofdecision problems under uncertainty:
consequences are mutually exclusive.^
The independence axiom, coupled with the other standard rational choice assumptions, has the
remarkable implication that there exists a utility function defined over consequences, U:C-*^, such
that
' • ' I * j
N- N • •
L>L' ^ 2:^,.C/(Cy)> (2.2)
,, 1=1,
where again," f,- is the probability'that consequence q will attain under L and is the probability that
consequence q wiU'attain under L'. In other words,"with the independence axiom, the utility function
over lotteries can always be represented as the mathematical expectation of a utility function defined
over consequences, that is V{L) =E[V{c)\ where £[•] is the mathematical expectation operator. As
such, the utility function V{L) is linear in probabilities. The function U{c)' is usually referred to as
the von Neumann-Morgenstem (vNM) utility function."' This vNM utility function JJ{c) is
0 r ' I ' ' t
Despite its theoretical appeal, the empirical validity of the independence axiom has been
questioned, especially in light of the so-called Allais paradox [Allais (1953)].
' . • ' i ••
^ This convention recognizes these authors' pioneering contribution to the development of the EU
model in von Neumann and Morgenstem (1944). But others call £/(•) the Bernoulli utility function, in
recognition of Daniel Bernoulli's-solution of the St. Petersburg -paradox [Bernoulli (1738)], which
anticipated some of the feamres of the EU model. ^
monotonically increasing and is cardinal in the sense that it is defined up to an increasing linear
transformation [that is, if JJ{c) represents the preference relation t., then any U{c) = a + /3 U{c),
with /3 > 0, provides an equivalent representation of this relation]. When the outcomes of interest
are described by continuous random variables with joint cumulative distribution function F(c), the EU
model implies that V(F) = [Uic)dF{c). In conclusion, in the EU model the problem of selecting the
action that induces the most preferred probability distribution reduces to that of maximizing the
expected utility of outcomes. ^
Versions of the EU model more general than the one just discussed are available. Perhaps the ^
most important is the EU model with subjective probability developed by Savage (1954).'^ In this
framework one does not assume that the probabilities of various states of the world are objectively
given. Rather, the existence of probabilities for the states of nature and of a vNM utility function for
the consequences are both implied by a set of axioms. Prominent among these is the "sure-thing"
axiom, roughly equivalent to the independence condition discussed earlier. A crucial element for this
approach is that probabilities are inherently subjective, an idea pioneered by de Finetti (1931).
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2.2. Risk aversion ^
The EU model allows us to capture in a natural way the notion of risk aversion, which is a
fundamental feature of the problem of choice under uncertainty. This notion is made precise when
the consequences that matter to the decision maker are monetary outcomes, such that the vNM utility
function is defined over wealth, say U{w) where w E SK is realized wealth. In a very intuitive sense,
a decision maker is said to be risk averse if, for every lottery F(w), she will always prefer (at least
^ Anscombe and Aumann (1963) provide an easier (albeit somewhat different) set-up within which
one can derive Savage's subjective EU model.
weakly) the certain amount Elwl to the lottery F(u')'itself, i.e., U[ {wdF(w)] S J U{w)dFiw)
[Arrow (1965); Pratt (1964)]. But by Jensen's inequality, this condition is equivalent to C/(>v) being
concave. Thus, concavity ofthe vNM utility function provides the fundamental characterization of
risk aversion.
In many applied problems it is of interest to qu^tify risk aversion. For'example, when can we
say that an agent a is more risk' averse than another agent b? Given the representation of risk
aversion in terms of the concavity of U{') , then we can say that agent a is globally more risk averse
than agent b ifwe can find an increasing concave function g(*) such that giU{), where f/,-
I 1 •, ' .
denotes the utility function of agent i (i^aib). An interesting question, in this context, concerns how
the degree of risk aversion of a given agent changes with the level ofwealth. For this purpose, two
measures of risk aversion that have become standard are the Arrow-Pratt coefficient of absolute risk
aversion A{w) and the Arrow-=Pratt coefficient of relative riskaversion R{w) [Arrow (1965); Pratt
(1964)]. Because concavity of U{w) is equivalent to risk aversion, the degree of concavity of U{w),
as capmred for example by , is a candidate to measure the degree of risk aversion. But
because C/(m') is defined only up to an increasing linear transformation, we need to normalize by
U'{w) > 0 to obtain a measure that is unique for a given preference ordering. Thus, the coefficient of
absolute risk aversion is defined as A{w) = As is apparent from its definition,
absolute risk aversion is useful for comparing the attitude of an agent towards a given gamble at
^ Note that A{w) can also be used to compare the risk aversion oftwo agents. IfA^(w) and /4^(w)
are the coefficients derived from the vNM utility functions and , respectively, then agent a is more
risk averse than agent b if AJ^w) > Afj{w) for all w. This characterization is equivalent to that given
earlier in terms of being an increasing concave transformation of Uf^.
different levels of wealth. It seems natural to postulate that agents will become less averse to a given
gamble as their wealth increases. This is the notion of decreasing absolute risk aversion (DARA).
i.e.. A{w) is a decreasing function of w [when A(w) is merely nonincreasing in w, the notion is
labeled nonincreasing absolute riskaversion (NIARA)]. As we shall see. most comparative statics
results of optimal choice under uncertainty rely on this condition.
Sometimes, however, it is interesting to inquire about the attitude of risk-averse decision makers
towards gambles that are expressed as a fraction of their wealth. This type of risk preference is
captured by the coefficient of relative risk aversion R{w) s wA{\v). Unlike the case of absolute risk
aversion, there are no compelling a priori reasons for any particular behavior of R{w) with respect lo
w. An assumption that is sometimes invoked is that of nonincreasing relative risk aversion (NIRRA).
implying that an agent should not become more averse to a gamble expressed as a fixed percentage of
her wealth as the level of wealth increases.^
Of some interest for applied analysis are utility functions for which A(w) and R{w) are constant.
The constant absolute risk aversion (CARA) utility function is given by U(w) = , where X is
the (constant) coefficient of absolute risk aversion. The constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) utility
function is given by U(w) =(w'~'')/(l -p) if p 1, and by U(w) =log(w) if p = I, where p is the
(constant) coefficient of relative risk aversion.^
^ Arrow (1965) suggests that the value of R(w) should hover around 1 and, if anything, should be
increasing in w. His arguments are predicated on the requirement that the utility function be bounded,
a condition that allows EU to escape a modified St. Petersburg paradox [Menger (1934)]. The relevance
of these boundedness arguments for thebehavior of R(w). however, depends on t/( ) being defined on
the domain (0, +<»), a requirement that can be safely dropped in most applications.
^ Note that, whereas CARA utility can bedefined on (- oo, +oo), CRRA utility is at most defined
on (0, +oo). CARA and CRRA are special cases of the Hyperbolic Absolute Risk Aversion utility
function.
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2.3. Ranking distributions
As discussed, the choice problem under uncertainty can be thought of as a choice among distributions
(lotteries), with risk-averse agents preferring distributions that are "less risky." But how can we rank
distributions according to their riskiness? Earlier contributions tried to provide such ranking based on
a univariate measure of variability, such as the^variance or standard deviation [for example,,the
portfolio theory of Markowitz (1952) and Tobin (1958) relied on a mean-standard deviation
approach]. But it was-soon determined that, for arbitrary distributions, such ranking is always
consistent with EU only,if the vNM utility function is quadratic. Because of the restrictiveness of this
condition, a more general approach,has been worked.out in what are known as the stochastic
dominance conditions [Hadar and Russell (1969); Hanoch and Levy (1969); Rothschild and Stiglitz
(1970)]. . , ^
A distribution F(h') is said to first-order stochastically dominate (FSD) another distribution G{w)
if, for every nondecreasing function t/(.),wehave • i
00
-00
U(w)dFiw) > {'"U{w)dGiw). (2.3)
— 00
A It can be shown that under FSD one must have F(w) < (^(h') for all- iv^a condition that provides an
s operational way of implementing-FSD.' Thus; this condition captures the idea that more is better in
the sense that any agents for'which w is a "goba"'should prefer F(w) to Giw). More to the point of
choosing between distributions based on their riskiness, F{w) is said to second-order stochastically
. i, ,
dominate (SSD) another distribution G(h') if the condition in (2.3) holds for every increasing and
concave function t/(.) [such that any risk averter will prefer F(iv) to Cr(iv)]. It can be shown that in
such a case one has
11
' w
-oa
m - G{t)]dt ^ 0
for every w. Thus, (2.4) provides an operational characterization ofSSD that can be used to compare
distributions. A closely related notion is that of amean-preserving spread [Rothschild and Siiglitz
(1970)], which consists of taking probability mass away from a closed interval and allocating it
outside that interval so that the mean of the distribution is unchanged. It turns out that, if a
distribution function G(.) can be obtained from F(*) by a sequence of such mean-preserving spreads,
then Ft) SSD the distribution G(.). Thus, when F{w) and G(>v) have the same mean, the notion of
a mean-preserving spread is equivalent to that of second-order stochastic dominance.
One should note that FSD and SSD produce only partial ordering of probability distributions. It is
quite possible for any two distributions that neither one stochastically dominates the other, so that we
cannot know for sure which one would be preferred by a particular risk-averse agent. Still, stochastic
dominance and mean-preserving spreads give a precise characterization of what it means to have an
increase in risk, and these conditions have proved to be extremely useful in analyzing the economic
impact of changes in risk [Rothschild and Stiglitz (1971)].
When the distributions being compared are restricted to belonging to a particular class, it mms
out that the validity of ranking distributions based on their mean and standard deviation can be
rescued. In particular, if all distributions being compared differ from one another by a location and
scale parameter only [i.e., G(w) =F[(i +ow), where n and a are the location and scale parameters,
respectively], then, as Meyer (1987) has shown, the mean-standard deviation ordering ofdistributions
is quite general, in the sense that it is equivalent (for this class ofdistributions) to second-order
stochastic dominance ordering.® The location-scale condition is restrictive (for example, it requires
^ As argued by Sinn (1989), there seem to exist earlier statements of this result.
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that an increase invariance-occurs if and only if a mean-preserving spread occurs). Nonetheless, this
condition applies to a number ofinteresting economic problems by the very definition ofthe problems
themselves (for example, the theory of the competitive firm under price uncertainty) and also has
some expositional value as discussed by Meyer (1987).^
(
3. The agricultural producer under uncertainty and risk aversion
The decision enviromhent of agricultural producers is generally multifaceted and complex. Many
distinct sources of risk may exist, andmany discretionary actions may be available.to the decision
maker. Decisions and realizations of randomness may occur at several points in time. Further,
actions may influence the distributions of yet-to-be realized random variables, while the realizations of
random variables may alter the consequences of subsequent actions. To represent such an intricate
network of interactions is analytically very difficult, but insights are possible by^focusing on simpler
stylized models. Thus, in the analysis that follows we start with an exceedingly simple model, and
then gradually increase the complexity of the decision environment that we study. But first, an
outline of model specifications that have the most relevance to agricultural decision making under
uncertainty is in order.
5.7. Modeling price and production uncertainty
As outlined earlier, the main risks that a typical farmer faces are due to the fact that output prices are
not known with certainty when production decisions are made and that the production process
contains inherent sources of uncertainty (i.e., the relevant.technology is stochastic). It is important,
therefore, to understand how these fundamental sources of risk affect production decisions.
^ In any case, it should be clear that this result does not establish equivalence between EU and a
linear mean-variance objective function, a criterion used in many agricultural economics applications.
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To capture the essence of price risk for competitive producers, consider the problem of choosing
output qto maximize E[U{wq +ir)], where Wq is the initial wealth and profit tt is random due to
price uncertainty, that is,
TT = pq - C{q,r) - K,
where p denotes output price, C{q,r) is the (variable) cost function (conditional on the vector of
input prices r), and Krepresents fixed costs. This is essentially the model considered by Sandmo
(1971), among others. Note that, because there is no production uncertainty in this model, the
technology ofproduction has been conveniently represented by the cost function C{q,r) so that the
relevant choice problem can be couched as a single-variable unconstrained maximization problem.
When the production function is stochastic, it is clear that a standard cost function cannot
represent the production technology [Pope and Chavas (1994)]. Thus, for the pure production
uncertainty case, the production problem is best represented as that ofchoosing the vector of inputs x
to maximize £'[C/(>i'o +x)], with random profit given by
(3 2")
TT = pG{x\e) - rx ~ K,
where G{x\e) represents the stochastic production function by which realized output depends on the
vector of inputs x and a vector of random variables e. The latter represents factors that are important
for production but are typically outside the complete control of the farmer (examples include weather
conditions, pest infestations, and disease outbreaks). It is clear that, in general, the production
uncertainty case is more difficult to handle than the pure price risk case. In particular, it is typically
necessary to restrict one's attention to the special case where e is a single random variable. Versions
To emphasize and clarify what the source of uncertainty is in any particular model, the overstruck
~ will often be used to denote a random variable.
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of this model have been studied by Pope and Kramer (1979) and MacMinn and Holtmann (1983),
among others.
Because price and production uncertainty are both relevant to agricultural production, it seems
that the relevant model should allow-for both sources .of risk.. Essentially, this entails m^ng price
a random variable in (3.2). Joint consideration of price and production risk turns out to be rather
difficult. Some results can be obtained, however, if the production risk is muhiplicative, an
assumption that was systematically used by Newbery and Stiglitz (1981), by Innes.(1990) and by
Innes and Rausser (1989). Specifically, the production function is written as eH{x), where e is a
non-negative random variable (without'loss of generality, assume'£[^ =1), and so one chooses input
vectorXto maximize H[C/(>Vo + tt)] with random profit given by
TT = peH{x) - rx - K.
Obviously, if the analysis is restricted to the consideration of a single random variable e = pe, it is
clear that this model is isomorphic to the pure price risk case. In fact, as noted by a number of
authors Pope and'Chavas (1994); Lapan and Moschini (1994); O'Dbnnell and Woodland (1995)], in
this case there exists a standard cost fiinction conditional on expected output, say C(q,r) where q is
expected output, that is dual to the production technology. Hence, the decision problem under ' '
joint price and (multiplicative) production risk can also be expressed as a single-variable
unconstrained optimization problem because random profit in (3.3) can be equivalently expressed as
T = peg ~C(q,r) - K. (3-4)
Before proceeding, we may note some restrictive features of the models just outlined. First, the
models are static. There are essentially only two dates: the date at which decisions are made and the
Hence, for any given vectorx of inputs, q =H(x).
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date at which uncertainty is realized (in panicular. all decisions here are made before the resolution of
uncertainty). Second, we are considering only one output and, for the time being, we are ignoring
the possibility of rislc management strategies. Although some of these assumptions will be relaxed
later, such simplifications are necessary to get insights into the basic features ofthe production
problem under risk.
In this setting, the basic questions that one may want to ask are: (i) How does the existence of
uncertainty affect choice? (ii) Given uncertainty, how does achange in an exogenous variable affect
choice? and (iii) To what extent does the existence ofuncertainty alter the nature of the optimization
problem faced by the decision maker? For three of the basic contexts that we have outlined above
(pure price risk, pure production risk with only one random variable, and joint price and production
risk with multiplicative production risk), the answers to these questions can be characterized in a
unified framework.
3.2. Static models under risk neutrality
Section 2presented some concepts concerning the effects of riskiness on the expected value ofa
function. The first- and second-derivatives of a function were found to be key in determining how
shifts in a stochastic distribution affect the expected value of a function. Although the structure of
risk preferences, as expressed by the utility function, is certainly ofconsequence in determining the
effects of risk on choice, risk-neutral decision makers may also be influenced by risk. Consider an
expected profit-maximizing producer who faces a profile of profit opportunities z(a,^,e) where a is a
vector of choices (actions) at the discretion of the producer, (3 is a vector of exogenous parameters,
and e is a single random variable that follows the cumulative distribution function Fie). Without loss
ofgenerality, let «G [0, 1]. The producer's problem is to
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Max
a
lz(a,^.€)dF{e), • ' (3-5)
which yields the vector of first-order conditions {QZ^(fl,j3,6)dF(e) =0, where z^(.) = dz{.)lda.
Assuming that the choice vector is a singleton, and given concavity of z(i3,/3, ^ in a, from the
concepts of stochastic dominance discussed earlier it is clear that an FSD shift in e will increase
optunal a if z^g(a,j3,e) ^ 0 Ve G [0, 1], whereas an SSD shift will increase optimal choice if, for all
e G [0, 1], > 0 and < 0. , .
A specification of z(<3,/3, ,e) which is of immediate, interest is that of pure price risk as given by
(3.1), where a = q and where the stochastic output price satisfies ^ =/Sj +(e -1)^2
7 s £ [e]). One may interpret /Sj +(e -1)^2 ^ ^ location and scale family of stochastic output
price distributions withmean price equal to j8j =p > 0, and the price variation parameter equal to
^ 0. Then the first-order condition for expected profit maximization is pr ^) = 0». only
the mean of the stochastic price is of relevance in determining optimal choice.
The more general form, where i cannot be separated out in this manner, may arise when
production is stochastic. Then, even if Za^(.) > 0, an increase in 7 does not necessarily imply an
incre^e in optimal a. The stochastic shift in e must be of the FSD dominating type, and an increase
in the mean of ? is necessary but insufficient for such a shift to occur.
It is also interesting to note that, in this risk-neutral case, an increase in an exogenous variable,
say pjy will increase optimal choice if > 0 Ve 6 [0, 1], regardless .of the distribution of
e:
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da ^ ^ Q (3 6)
3.3. Static models under risk aversion
Given tlie payoff z(a,p, e), the objective ofa risk-averse producer is written as;
Max
a
]uiz(a.0,e)]dF(.i), (3-7)
where U{.) is increasing and concave, profit ^(.) is held to increase in e, and the objective function
is concave in a, i.e., A= E{U^Ji.][Za(.)f +UJi.]Zaai-)} < 0. Aspects of this problem, such as
requirements on the nature of the utility function and payoff fimction and on the nature of the
stochastic shift such that a increases, havebeen considered in some detail by Meyer and Ormiston
(1983, 1985) and Eeckhoudt and Hansen (1992), among others. The first-order condition is
'^c/,[z(fl,/3,e)]z„(a,/3,e)dF(e) =0, (3.8)
with parameterized solution at the value a* =a[F{e),(3].
3.3.1. Introduction of uncertainty
To ascertain how uncertainty affects choice for a risk averter, we will follow Krause (1979) and Katz
(1981) and compare the solution under uncertainty with the solution when uncertainty is removed by
setting the random element equal to its mean (i.e., setting e= e). When uncertainty is removed, risk
preferences are irrelevant, and the optimal choice d satisfies Zfl(a,^,e) =0. When uncertainty exists,
on the other hand, then the first-order condition can be expressed as
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Acov[y,(.).z„(.)] +£[yjC)]£W-)] =0. - • (3-9)
If ZaJ.-) S 0. then the fact that the expectation of the product of two negatively covarying variates is
less than the product of the expectations, together with risk aversion, implies that the covariance term
must be negative. Because marginal utility is positive, satisfaction of the first-ofder condition •
requires that E[Zat)] ^ 0 when Za^t) ^ 0. We wish to compare a*, the solution under uncertainty,
with a. IfZaeet) ^ tlisn Jensen's inequality implies E[Zg{d,p,e)] <0. But we know that
E[Zaia *, /3, ?)] SO given > 0, and it follows that E[zja *, (3, - E[Za{a. /3, e)] SO. Because
the only difference between the two expectations is the evaluation ofa, and because Zgi.) is
* ' f ' ,1
decreasing in a, then a* <d [Krause (1979)]. The reduction in optimal a arises for two reasons.
First, even for a risk-neutral producer, the existence ofuncertainty reduces input use because it
decreases the expected marginal value of the input, . Second, risk aversion means that the
increase in utility associated with an increase in e from.le is (in absolute value) lower than the
decrease inutility associated with a decrease of the same magnitude in e.from I. Because
(that is, an increase in a renders the payoff function more sensitive to the source of risk), the risk-
averse producer will reduce sensitivity by decreasing a- ,
For an expected utility maximizer with payoff (3.1) (i.e., a competitive producer under price
uncertainty only), it is clear that z^J,.) = 1 > 0 and 2ag£(.) =0 < 0, so that the existence of price
uncertainty reduces production. For payoff (3.2) (i.e., a competitive producer with stochastic
production), G^g(.) S 0 and ^ 0 are sufficient conditions to sign the impact of introducing
uncertainty. For a detailed analysis of input choice under stochastic production for risk-averse agents
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see Ramaswami (1992), who established requirements on an input-conditioned distribution function
for a riskaverter to choose less, or more, than an expected profit maximizer. A parallel analysis of
equation (3.9) shows that when z^^C.) < 0 and ^ 0, then risk aversion implies a" > a. The
price uncertainty payoff [equation (3.1)] never conforms to Zq/.) ^ 0, but the production uncertainty
model may. Thus, we see that the impact of the existence ofuncertainty on optimal choice by a risk
averter depends upon second and third cross-derivatives of the payoff function.
3.3.2. Marginal changes in environment
We now look at marginal changes in the decision environment, as represented by an increase in /3.
Intuitively, we know that the conditions required to identify the effects of these marginal changes are
likely to be more stringent than those required to sign the effects of introducing uncertainty.
Following Ormiston (1992), we differentiate equation (3.8) partially with respect to a and /3 to obtain
da 1
A J
^A[z]z^t)U^l]Za(.)dF{e) - l|Jl/,[.]z,0(.)rfF(e), (3.10)
where A[.] = is the absolute risk-aversion function defined earlier. Now we can
partition the effect of /3 on a in three, which we will call (A) the wealth impact, (B) the insurance
impact, and (C) the coupling impact [Hennessy (1998)]. The coupling impact is represented by the
expression - \lu^l]Zap{-)dF{e)/A in (3.10) and has the sign of z^^(.) if this term is uniform in
sign. If /3 acts to increase the marginal effect of a on payoff z(.), then it will increase the producer s
disposition to use a. For the price uncertainty case of (3.1) with p =^^ +{e-
Za0^{-) =1- For the production uncertainty case of (3.2), wherep is anonstochastic shift variable.
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we have = G„(.) > 0. '
Many agricultural support policies are constructed with the specific intent ofhaving or not having
a coupling effect. A.price subsidy on an exogenous, institutional output or input quantity is
decoupled in the sense that ==0, whereas with a true price subsidy the actual quantity is
coupled. As an illustration, a modification of specification (3.1) is
z(a,jS, e) =[/3i +(i-e)/32]fl- C(a,r) + where G{a^) is some exogenous instimtional
reference production level. Here, ^ 0, but =0. However, =i - 7 in this case,
and this coupling effect does not have a uniform sign.
Effects (A) and (B) are intertwined in the first term on the right-hand side of (3.10). Let
y(.,6) =/l[.]z^(.), so the expression is Jo7(.,e)i72[.]z^(.)rfF(€)/A. Integrating by parts yields
I
A J 0
y(.,v) [- '^C/,yz^(.)^/F(e)
V=1
• 1
v=0 0.
U,l]z^{.)dF(e)
(3.11)
where v is used as the dummy variable of integration for the variable e. To identify effects (A) and
(B) note that, if > 0, the first-order condition (3.8) implies that the expression
{0^ dF(€) is never positive because ofthe positivity ofmarginal utility and because Zjj(.) is
negative at low € and increases to be positive at high e . Therefore, given A < 0, Q is positive if
dJ{.,v)ldv < 0. Differentiate to obtain df{.,v)/dv ^Zp{.)A^[.]z^{.) +A[.]zp^{.). The first part of this
expressionmay be called the wealth effect (A) because its negativity depends upon the NIARA
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property and the sign of z^i.) (recall that z^(.) S 0). All other things equal, if /3 shifts the
distribution ofpayoffs rightward (z^(.) > 0), as would be the case with a reduction in fixed costs K
inpayoff specifications (3.1) or (3.2), and if preferences are NIARA ^ increases.
When p =Pi +(e-7)^32, then z^^(.) > 0 for specification (3.1). Because ^ 0, both coupling
andwealth effects act to increase optimal a, and this is the Sandmo (1971) result that NIARA is
sufficient for a shift in meanprice to increase production. Notice that because = 0, the second
part of dJ{.)ldv may be ignored. Whereas jSj has both wealth and coupling effects, it is easy to
describe a wealth effect that does not Mso involve coupling. Setting
z{a,^,e) = [/Sj +(e-e)|32]fl - C(fl,r)-^r +183 G(ao)> an increase in jSg or a decrease inA: induces
an increase in optimal a under NIARA. Coupling may also occur without wealth effects, although
this case is somewhat more difficult to show.
The second part, ^[.]z^g(.), is the insurance effect (B). If the favorable exogenous shift acts to
stabilize income, that is if z^^{.) < 0 or /3 advances less fortunate slates of the environment by more
than it advances more fortunate states, then optimal a tends to increase. This would occur in
specification (3.2) if /3 =/? and G^J.) < 0. In the case of an insurance contract on the source of
uncertainty, say M{^, e), the payoff is p G{a, l)-wa-K + e) and the insurance contract
decreases risk if < 0 while pG^{.) +M^(.) > 0. The similarity of wealth (i.e., risk aversion)
and insurance effects has been discussed in detail by Jewitt (1987).
Because of the price uncertainty inherent in agricultural production environments, the effect of an
increase in ^2 the specification (3.1), where p = +{e-1)^2^ of particular importance.
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From ^ be-seen that the, P2 parmneter has a negative insurance effect. It has already
been concluded, however^that the coupling effect of 132. that is z^^^(.), does not have aunifonn
sign. Thus, although it may be intuitive to expect that ah'increase in ^2 would decrease optimal a, to
determine that requires more work inaddition to the NIARA assumption [Batra and Ullah (1974);
Ishii (1977)]. Since changing the parameter ^2 i" this setting does not cover the set of all
Rothschild and Stiglitz mean-preserving spreads, the above results do not demonstrate that all mean-
preserving spreads ofprice decrease the optimal choice for the model in (3.1). Whereas Meyer and
Ormiston (1989), Ormiston (1992), and 'GoIlier (1^995), among othersVhave made advances'toward
identifying precisely the set of spreiads that act* to decrease production'for NIARA and various
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conditions'on the payofffunction, this problem has not yet been completely solved. ••
3.3.3. Uncertainty and cost minimization. . v.' ; • ' ji-.- •
It is well known that profit maximization is predicated upon satisfaction of the cost minimization
assumption. Does cost minimization continue to hold under risk, when the objective is expected
utility maximization? It turns out that the answer'is yes, provided that "cost minimization" is suitably
defined. Consider the competitive firm where'the input vector x is chosen to maximize
E[U(Wq +#)], where 'tt =i?(x, e) -rx.' Here R{x, i) is a revenue profile (that can accommodate both
price and/or production uncertainty) and i denotes the source of revenue uncertainty. Pope and
The conclusions drawn thus far are, of course, only relevant for the given context. Noting that
peasants in less developed,countries often consume a significant fraction of their own production,
Finkelshtain and Chalfant (1991) concluded that production and consumption decisions cannot be modeled
separately for these agents. Their generalization of the Sandmo model suggests that production may
plausibly increase under an increase in price uncertainty.
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Chavas (1994) show that, if the revenue profile satisfies the restriction R{x,e) =K(\l/ix), e), where
is (possibly) vector-valued,' then the relevant cost function can be written as C(^^,r), where
is the vector of conditioning values corresponding to the function ^{x). Hence, technical efficiency is
satisfied in the sense that the EU maximizing choice of x is consistent with the cost minimizing means
of obtaining some (vector) level of \l/{x). The simplest special case arises with multiplicative
production risk, when R{x, e) =H{x) I. As anticipated in section 3.1, in such a case the cost function
is written as C(q,r), where q is expected output. Thus, the relevant cost function for this special
case is rather standard, with the expected output level playing the role of a deterministic output level
under certainty. More generally, however, a vector of conditioning values will be needed. For •
example, if there is no price risk but the production function has the stochastic form suggested by Just
and Pope (1978) (to be discussed further in section 4.2), then revenue is written as
R =pM{x) +p [V(a:)] e with £[ e] =0. It follows that the EU-consistent cost function here can be
written as C(q,(P',r), where ^ is a level of expected output [corresponding to the function M(x)] and
(P" is. a level of output variance [corresponding to the function V(:c)].
That cost minimization always holds for EU maximizers, even when the revenue profile does not
satisfy the restriction invoked by Pope and Chavas (1994), is shown by Chambers and Quiggin
(1998). Their approach is best illustrated for the production uncertainty case in which the random
variable e takes on a finite number (say N) of values. Given the stochastic production function
G{x, e), then realized output for any given realization of the random variable (e,-, say) is = G{x, .
If L denotes the probability of e; occurring, then the producer's EU problem is:
24
NliU{pG{x,ei) - rx). (3-12)
^ Jt=l
Now define a cost function Ciq^ qi^,r) as
^ V / = 1,2 A^}. (3.13)
X
One may note the formal similarities of Ciq^,... with a standard multioutput cost function,
although the interpretation here is rather different. At any rate, it follows that the producer's EU
maximization problem can be equivalently expressed as
N
Max ^ (iUlpqj - C{q^,q2 )• (3.14)
1=1
Thus, it is clear that EU maximizers do minimize costs, in some sense.
3.4. Dynamics andflexibility under uncertainty
A consideration of decision making under risk is not complete without discussion of the interactions
between risk and time. Although suppressed in the'two dates (oneperiod)models discussed above
(i.e., action at time 0 and realization at time 1), the fact is that time and uncertainty are intertwined
because information sets become more complete as time passes. To illustrate, we consider a simple
extension of the price uncertainty case of model (3.1). Specifically, let a = ,^2) such'that
z{a,^, e) is of form IR{Xy,X2) - r-^x^^ r-^x^ where i represents stochastic output price, and assume
that x^ is chosenbefore the realization of e, whereas X2 is chosen after' e is observed." Following
Hartman (1976), the problem may be posed as
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Max
Xt
^Max[6i?(;Ci,j:2) ~ r2X2]dF{€) - (3.15)0 X2
Applying backward induction, the second-stage problem is solved first. The first-order condition is
eR^ ix^,X2)^r2, where and e are now predetermined. Assuming strict concavity of R{.) in
the first-order condition is solved to yield x^ =S(Xy,r2,e). Given this short-run demand function for
A^, the producer problem reduces to
Max [nei?(;ci,5(;ci,r2.e)) - r2S{x^,r2.e)]dF{e) - r^x^. (3.16)
J 01- ^ ' J
Defining L(x^,r2,e) = ei2(Xi,5(Xi,r2,e)), the envelope theorem gives the first-order condition for
the first-stage problem (choosing x^) as
- r, =0 . (3.17)
Now, the Rothschild and Stiglitz mean-preserving spread condition implies that optimum x^ increases
with such aspread if Setting optimum output as G*{Xi,r2,e), the envelope
theorem can be used to show that this is the same as requiring G*^^{x^,r2,e) > 0. Further analysis
reveals that this condition is equivalent to the requirement that d[R^^^^{.)/R^^^{.)]/dx2 ^ 0. Thus,
when ex-post flexibility exists, the effects of uncertainty depend upon relationships between third
derivatives of the production technology. In general, although the impact ofa mean-preserving
spread in eon x^ depends upon the sign of d^S{.)/de^, the impact on x^ is less readily signed
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whereas the effect on mean R(.) is yet more difficult to sign. Obviously, the analysis becomes even
more involved when decision makers are assumed to be risk averse.
A second set of problems, called real optionproblems because of structural analogies with
financial options, arise from the interactions between time and uncertainty in long-term investment
decisions when there are sunk costs or irreversible actions.' Consider a decision in 1999 to invest in
precision farming education and equipment. At that time it was not yet clear whether the technology
was worth adopting. The decision maker may invest early in the hope that the technology will turn
out to be profitable. But the investment may turn out to be unprofitable, so-there is also an incentive
to defer the decision for a year, say, to leam'more about the technology in the intervening period.
But deferment will mean losing a year of additional profits if the technology turns out to be •
profitable. Similar sunk cost and information problems may arise in a nuiriber of other farm '
production decisions. Although real option problems such as these can be addressed by rigorous
stochastic neoclassical models [e.g., Chavas (1994) or Feinerman, Choi, and Johnson (1990)] or by
standard optimal control approaches [Rausser and Hochman (1979)], the more'structured contingent
claims approach popularized by Dixit and Pindyck (1994) has assumed prominence because it lends
itself to empirical arid theoretical analysis. • ' •
A kylized continuous-time variant of dynamic programming, real option theory connects time and
r
uncertainty by modeling-a source of randomness as a.stochastic process evolving over time. Some
such processes give rise to differential equation reliationships between the distribution, time, and the
flow of rewards. These relationships can be solved to give a decision-conditioned expected present
value, and this expected present value is then optimized over the choice set. The choice set may '
involve deciding to invest now or to wait, or deciding how much to invest. Marcus and Modest
(1984) studied optimal decisions for producers facing price and yield uncertainty and using futures
markets, whereas Turvey (1992b) used the approach to study agricultural support policies inCanada.
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Purvis et al. (1995) adopted the framework to explain Texas dairy industry technology adoption
decisions under cost and regulatory uncertainty, and found that the expected rate of return on the
proposed investment might have to bedouble the threshold identified by a nonstochastic analysis for
the decision to be attractive. The approach also provides a simple way of studying adjustment costs.
For example, Leahy (1993), studied shutdown and startup costs for a competitive firm facing random
prices.
4. Selected empirical issues
Our cursory review thus far has privileged analytical methods and theoretical analyses. But
considerable empirical research in agricultural economics has been done to test, quantify, and
otherwise put to use a number of features of riskmodels. In this section we will look» in some detail,
at a number of contributions that have had a primarily empirical bent.
4.1. Identifying risk pr^erences
In an early empirical study of agricultural decision making under risk, Lin, Dean andMoore (1974)
elicited preferences over hypothetical lotteries from managers of six large Californian farms. Using
quadratic programming methods, they estimated the mean-variance frontier available to the farmer.
They then compared the farm plans suggested by the elicited preference structure with plans suggested
by the expected profit maximization rule, with plans suggested by lexicographic preference structures,
and with the actual implemented plans. They found that, although no stylized preference structure
was clearly a superior fit, for each of the six farms the EU framework performed at least as well as
the other paradigms. For Nepalese rice farmers, Hamal and Anderson (1982) also used hypothetical
lotteries and found evidence in support of DARA. The analysis was less conclusive concerning the
slope of relative risk aversion.
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•Dillon and Scandizzo (1978) modified the approach ofLin, Dean and Moore (1974) by eliciting
preferences from a relatively large number of subsistence farmers and sharecroppers in northeastern
Brazil. Risk attitudes were imputed from choices between hypothetical lotteries that realistically
reflected the'farm payoffs faced by these decision makers. Unlike the study by ,Lin, Dean and
Moore, however, the hypothetical decisions were not validated through .comparison with actual .
decisions. The lotteries posed were of two types,'those: inwhich the family subsistence requirement
was covered biit surplus income was at risk, and those inwhich the subsistence requirement was also
at risk. Hypothetical returns were adjusted until certainty equivalence between lottery comparisons
was established. The replies were then fitted to three decision criteria: mean-standard deviation,
mean-variance, and CARA'expected utility objective functions. As expected, both farmers and .
sharecroppers tended to bemore risk averse when subsistence income was at risk. Surprisingly, •
smallholders tended to be more risk averse than sharecroppers. Dillon,andScandizzo (1978),found
less clear evidence about the impact of socioeconomic factors on risk attitudes. Perhaps the most •
interesting indication was that, even within seemingly homogeneous groups, a wide dispersion of risk
preferences appeared to exist. i i
Taking an econometric approach, Moscardi and de Janvry (1977) estimated a Cobb-Douglas
production function for corn with data from small Mexican subsistence farms. Using a safety-first
framework, they imputed a measure of risk aversion from the divergence between actual fertilizing
decisions and optimal decisions under risk neutrality. They found evidence of considerable risk
aversion, and they also suggested that risk attitudes might be functions of socioeconomic variables
(such as family size and age of operator) that may evolve'over time. Brink and.McCarl (1978) also
estimated risk attimdes as a residual that rationalizes observed choices relative to "optimal" ones as
predicted by a mathematical programming model (relying on a linear mean-standard deviation
objective function). Thirty-eight mid-western crop producers at a Purdue^University decision analysis
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workshop listed their resources and identified their preferred crop acreage allocation plan. The risk
parameter giving aplan deemed closest to the announced plan was assumed to represent risk
preferences. The analysis concluded that risk aversion seemed to be low. Measuring risk essentially
as a residual, however, is anobvious limitation ofthese studies (because such a procedure ignores
other potential reasons for observed decisions to depart from the model's optimal decisions.)
Because of the limitations of inferring risk from observed production decisions, and because
hypothetical payout surveys can give unstable results, Binswanger (1980) made real payments to
peasant farmers in India. Outcomes were determined by tossing a dice, and the amount at risk varied
from 0.5 rupees to 500 rupees (negative payout states were not considered). The 500 rupees payout
amounted to about 2.3 percent of average household wealth, and corresponded in magnitude to
substantial fertilization investments. (It was believed that some households were constrained by
capital resources from fertilizing adequately.) Preliminary tests found that individuals tended to treat
money gifted to them on the day of the experiment for the purpose ofparticipating in the experiment
as if it were their own. Preliminary results also suggested that once lotteries for low gambles had
primed individuals to making lottery decisions about real money, then a hypothetical 500 rupees game
appeared to give results that were statistically similar to a real 500 rupees game. To conserve
financial resources, the hypothetical 500 rupees game was used thereafter.
Capturing risk attitudes by the coefficient ofpartial risk aversion, it was found that subjects
tended to become more risk averse as the size of the gamble increased. Compared with the
hypothetical scenario interviewing method, the imputed risk aversion coefficient was less dispersed
when real money was involved. This would suggest that the interviewees may have had difficulty
taking the interviews as seriously as they would real-world decisions. On the effects of
The coefficient ofpartial risk aversion is defined as +wq), where Wq is
initial wealth and tt is profit.
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socioeconomic characteristics, Binswanger (1980) found that wealthier, better educated, and more
progressive farmers tended to be less risk averse, as did those who had off-farm salaries. Prior luck
in the game also tended to reduce the degree of risk aversion (only, the luck regressor, however, had
consistently high t statistics across all gamble sizes). Overall, Binswanger interpreted the results as
being supportive of the hypothesis that it is resource^.and infrastructural constraints, such as access to
information and credit,^ that induce caution among peasants rather than the hypothesis of innate
conservatism. ' ^
In a different analysis of these Indian data, .Binswanger (1981) considered the foundations ofthe
EU framework and concluded that decision makers did not integrate possible outcomes from a gamble
with pre-existing income, but rather treated them separately in their decision calculus., This
conclusion is somewhat at variance with Binswanger's (1980) conclusion from.pretest analysis that
subjects treated gifted money as their own. -The separation ofgamble money from pre-existing wealth
lends some support to Kahneman and Tversky's (1979) prospect theory approach to decision making.
Failure of income integration has serious implications for.modeling decisions, but had generally been
ignored in the empirical literature. Binswanger also used inferences drawn from safety-first type ,
models to identify inconsistencies with the data,-and he concluded that, the decision makers did not
appear to act in a safety-first manner. .'Finally,'Binswanger identified evidence in the data-to support
both DARA and decreasing relative risk aversion (DRRA) preferences. ,>•
Surveying work on risk preferences and_ risk management to that time (including work by
Binswanger already cited). Young (1979) and Hazell (1982) raised concerns about all approaches.
The direct elicitation (interview) method is reliable only to the extent that it captures the preference
structure that would be used in real decisions, and evidence suggested that it might not do so.
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Experimental approaches might be too expensive to implement in developed countries.
Approaches based onobserved supply and input demand behavior impute risk as the residual
component explaining discrepancies between expected profit-maximizing solutions and actual
decisions. But discrepancies may be due to other effects, such as imperfect information and
heterogeneous resource endowments. To the extent that such research had identified determinants of
risk preferences, Young concluded that farmers in developing countries appeared to be more risk
averse than those in developed countries, and he observed that this conclusion is consistent with
DARA. But because the studies considered did not explicitly control for the availability and use of
risk management institutions, which tend to be more widely available in developed countries,
developed-country farmers may appear to be less risk averse than they acmally are.
Remming to the task of econometrically estimating risk structures, Antle (1987) expressed the
optimality conditions for EU maximizing choices in terms of a given individual's absolute risk
aversion and downside risk aversion coefficients.^^ The Generalized Method of Moments (GMM)
procedure was then applied to identify means, variances, and covariances of risk preference
parameters based on data from the International Crops Research Institute for the Semi-Arid Tropics
(ICRISAT) pertaining to one of the six Indian villages (Aurepalle) that had been considered by
Binswanger (1980, 1981). Antle (1987) found a mean Arrow-Pratt index similar to that reported in
Binswanger (1980). Dissatisfied that this approach required some, if only minimal, assumptions
concerning the technology available, Antle (1989) developed a method that did not involve joint
estimation with technology. Antle's view was that it would be better to estimate risk preference
Binswanger estimated that, were he to run his experiments in the United States, it would have cost
$150,000 (circa 1978) rather than $2,500.
This downside risk aversion coefficient is defined as Note that > 0 is
necessary for DARA.
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structures separately from technology rather than-jointly. His concerns about a joint,estimation arose
mainly from problems involving the data required- for the estimation of technology, and the discontent
with alternative econometric approaches to joint estimation. The econometric methods applied again
involved GMM estimation on data from the ICRISAT India village smdy.. The means of the Arrow-
'Pratt and downside risk aversion indices were, as expected, similar to those estimated earlier.
Among other econometric estimations^of risk attitudes,. Myers (1989) assumed CRRA and joint
lognormality of the distributions of output price and producer consumption, and developed a reduced-
form rational expectations approach to testing for the aggregate level of relative risk aversion for U.S.
producers who store crops. Annual data^over the period 1945 to 1983 suggest a coefficient of relative
risk aversion between 1.5 and 4.5 for com and wheat storers, but the estimates for soybeans are
implausible. Exploiting'technical attributes of CRRA and of constant partial relative risk aversion
(CPRRA),^^ Pope (1988) developed implications for optimal choices by individuals expressing such
preferences. In Pope and Just (1991), these implications, together with implications for choice under
CARA preferences, were tested on state-level Idaho potato acreage data. CARA and CPRRA-
hypotheses were rejected, but CRRA was not. Chavas and-Holt (1990), studying U.S.-level corn and
soybean acreage allocation decisions, also.used the tests proposed by Pope (1988) and rejected both
CRRA aind CPRRA. Testing for the impact.of wealth, proxied by an index of proprietor equity, on
allocation decisions, they found evidence to reject CARA in favor of DARA.
4.2. Estimating stochastic structures
As mentioned earlier, production risk is.an'essential feature of agriculture, and estimation of such
stochastic production structures has obvious immediate interest for farm management as well as to
16 This means that -•7rC/''(7r + +Wq) is invariant to changes in tt for the level of Wq in
question.
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address agricultural policy issues. For example, production uncertainty has implications for the
implementation ofcrop insurance. Also, environmental externalities such as water contamination and
ecosystem destruction may sometimes be traced back to the use of such agricultural inputs as nitrogen
and pesticides; production uncertainty, together with risk aversion, may increase application of these
inputs. Existing statistical procedures for studying relationships between stochastic distributions have
tended to emphasize stochastically ordered comparisons, such as first- and second-degree dominance,
between elements in a set of distributions. But economists, especially agricultural economists, are
often interested in conditional relationships. To reconstruct nonparametric stochastic relationships
betweencrop yield and input use would often require volumes of data beyond that usually available to
analysts. Further, as the literature on the impacts of stochastic shifts on decisions has shown, the
necessary and the sufficient conditions for a stochastic shift to have a determinate impact on the
decisions of a meaningful class of decision makers are generally not among the simpler types of
stochastic shifts.
The complexity of the decision environment is substantially reduced if one can treat technology as
being nonrandom. If one is primarily concerned with price uncertainty, then it might be convenient
to assume deterministic production. Thus, one can estimate the distribution of the realized random
element without regard to the choices made. In other cases, however, it is not possible to simplify
the decision environment in this way. Although random yield—the consequence of interactions
between choices and random weather variables—can be measured, it would be more difficult to
measure and aggregate in a meaningful manner the various dimensions of weather. In such a case, it
is more convenient to estimate the input-conditioned distribution of yield. Although they do not lend
themselves to estimating or testing for general production function relations, existing stochastic
ordering methods can be useful in testing for the nature of and impacts of exogenous stochastic shifts
in, say, the distribution of output price, and for studying discrete decisions such as the adoption of a
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new technology. • '
Although studies applying stochastic dominance methods to agricultural problems are numerous
[e.g., Williams at al. (1993)], most of these smdies compare point estimates of the distributions and
do not consider sampling'errors. Tolley and Pope (1988) developed* a-nonparametric permutation test
to discern whether a second-order dominance relationship exists. More recently, Anderson (1996)
used the nonparametric Pearson goodness-of-fit.test on-Canadian income distribution data over the
years 1973 to 1989 to investigate, with .levels ofstatistic^ confidence,' whether first-, second-, and
third-order stochastic dominance shifts occurred as time elapsed.
For input-conditioned output distributions. Just and Pope (1978) accounted for heteroskedasticity
by developing a method of estimating a two-moment stochastic production function by three-stage non
linear least squares techniques. The function is of the form
q = M(x) *
where q is output, £[?] =0, Var[e] = 1, and x is a vector of input choices. The functions M{x) and
V(a:) determine the conditional mean and variance of q, respectively, and can be chosen to be
sufficiently flexible to meet the needs of the analysis. Just and Pope (1979) applied their method to
Day's (1965) com and oats yield-fertilization data'set; and found the results' generally, but not totally,
supportive of the hypothesis that an increase in fertilization increases the variance of output. Their
readily estimable approach has proven to be popular in applied analyses. For example Traxler et al.
(1995) used the approach in a study of the yield attributes of different wheat varieties in the Yaqui
Valley (Mexico), and found that whereas earlier varietal research appeared to emphasize increasing
mean yield, later research appeared biased toward reducing yield variance.
Suggesting that mean and variance may not be sufficient statistics to describe stochastic
production, Antle and Goodger (1984) established a method for estimating an arbitrarily large number
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of input-conditioned moments. Applying their approach to large-scale California milk production,
they rejected the statistical hypothesis that input-conditioned mean and variance are sufficient
statistics. An interesting simulation finding was that a CARA decision maker facing the estimated
technology substantially increased dairy rations relative to a risk-neutral decision maker. This
suggests that the marginal risk premium in Ramaswami (1992) may be negative on occasion.
Nelson and Preckel (1989) identified the need for a flexible approach to estimating parametric
yield distributions when accommodating skewness is important. Gallagher (1987), among others, has
observed negative skewness for crop yields. -The Just-Pope approach is insufficiently flexible,
whereas the Antle-Goodger method, which is nonparametric, may be inefficient. Finding inspiration
in Day's (1965) suggestion that the beta distribution would likely fit most yield distributions quite
well, Nelson and Preckel conditioned beta distribution parameters on input choices. The output
density function is then
T/^, ./3^ ^min\a-l / _max
f(a\x) = r(Q:+/3) iq-q ) (g -gT (4.2)
^ r(a)r(/3)
where r(.) is the gamma function, output q is supported on the interval and the
distribution parameters are conditional on inputs, i.e., a = a(;c) and /3 = ^{x). For field-level corn
yields in five Iowa counties over the period 1961 to 1970, Nelson and Preckel set = 0, and let
both a(x) and Q{x) be Cobb-Douglas functions of nitrogen, phosphorus, potassium, field slope, and
soil clay content. Using a two-stage maximum likelihood method, they found that the marginal
effects of nitrogen, phosphorus, and potassium on skewness, variance, and"even mean were mixed in
sign.
The maximum likelihood approach to estimating parameterized conditional densities has proven to
be quite popular. A gamma distribution relationship between applied nitrogen levels and late spring
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soil nitrate'levels has been used in Babcock Md Blackmer (1992) to study the effects of information
concerning spring soil nitrate levels onsubsequent side-dressing and on expected profit; a beta
distribution has been applied by Babcock and Hennessy (1996) to study input use in the presence of
crop insurance. A different line of inquiry has sought to model the nonnormality of crop yield
distributions by estimating transformations of the normal distribution. Taylor (1990) employed a
hyperbolic trigonometric transformation to deviations from a linear yield trend estimation on com,
soybean, and wheat crops. Moss andShonkwiler (1993) and Ramirez (1997) have extended this
approach to accommodate stochastic yield trends andmultivariate distributions, respectively. But the
presumption that yields are not normally distributed has been called into question by Just and
Weninger (1999), who criticize a number of features of statistical analyses implemented by previous
studies and conclude that the empirical evidence against,normality is weak.
Stochastic production has implications for the estimation of dual representations of production
technologies. For example, as,discussed in section 2.3.3, when the production function is,affected by
multiplicative risk and,producers maximize expected utility the relevant cost function is C{q,r),
where q is expected output. When the stochastic production function is written more, generally as
Gix, e), the relevant cost function still has the structure C(q, r) if producers are risk neutral (they
maximize expected profits).Pope and Just (1996) call such a function the "ex-ante cost function,"
and convincingly argue that a number of previous studies have resulted in inconsistent estimates of
technological parameters because they have estimated a standard cost function C(q,'r) (conditional on
I • , • .
realized output q) when in fact they should havebeen estimating C(q,r). Estimation of the ex-ante
I
cost function C{q,r) is problematic, on the other hand, because it is conditional on expected output
17 Of course, in such a case the parameters of the cost function C(q,r) may include parameters of
the distribution of the random variable e.
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q, which is not observable. The solution proposed by Pope and Just (1996) entails estimating q
jointly with the structure of the ex-ante cost function. The specific procedure that they suggest fails
to achieve consistent estnnation of technological parameters because it does not address the nonlinear
errors-in-variables problem that typically arises in this context [Moschini, (1999)]. But by exploiting
the full implications of expected profit maximization, Moschini (1999) shows that it is possible to
effectively remove the errors-in-variables problem and obtain consistent estimation of the ex-ante cost
function parameters.
4.3. Joint estimation ofpr^erences and technology
Most research studies considered thus far have sought to identify risk preferences without estimating
the source of randomness, or they have sought to estimate the source of randomness without
simultaneously estimating the risk preference structure. Thosepapers that have simultaneously
identified risk preferences and the source of randomness [e.g., Moscardi and de Janvry (1977) or
Antle (1987)] have treated either one or both components in a rather elementary manner. Separating
the estimation of the two structures is econometrically inefficient to the extent that a joint estimation
imposes cross-estimation restrictions and accommodates error correlations. Using a Just-Pope
technology with Cobb-Douglas mean and variance functions together with a CARA risk preference
structure, cross-equation restrictions and a nonlinear three-stage least squares estimator, Love and
Buccola (1991) applied a joint estimation for Iowa corn and soybean production. The data pertained
to three of the five counties studied by Nelson and Preckel (1989). Love and Buccola found
considerable variation in the estimated coefficient of risk aversion across the three Iowa counties
under consideration. Concerning technology, they contrasted their results with a straightforward Just-
Pope estimation and with the Nelson and Preckel analysis to find that each estimated similar
technology structures.
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The Love and Biiccola approach is restrictive in the sense that GARA was imposed. Chayas and
Holt (1996) developed ajoint estimation method that is able to test for ,CARA or DARA. Applying-
their estimator to com and soybean acreage allocation inthe United States, and on a data set.much the
same as that used in their 1990 work, they assumed that the production technology was a quadratic
function of allocated acres and that the utility function, is
M(7r,,0 ='J?exp(ao +ayZ + +a^t) dz , where Lis a lower bound.on profit realizations, r is,-
time, the a are parameters to beestimated, ttj is profit inyear t, and z is a dummy variable of
integration. Their analysis found strong statistical evidence for the presence of downside risk
aversion and for rejecting CARA in favor of DARA.
Although the approach byChavas and Holt does generalize the representation of risk preferences,
the assumed technology was not flexible in the Just-Pope sense. Further, their specification can say
little about the impact of relative risk aversion. Using Saha's (1993) expo-power utility specification,
(/[tt] = -exp(-/37r") where.a-and /3 are parameters,to.be estimated, Saha, Shumway and Talpaz
(1994) assumed a Just-Pope technology and jointly estimated the system using maximum likelihood
methods. Data were for fifteen Kansas wheat farms-over the four years 1979 to 1982, and there were
two aggregated input indices in the stochastic technology (a capital index and a materials index). The
results supported the hypotheses of DARA and increasing relative risk aversion (IRRA). Also, the
materials index was found to be risk decreasing, so risk-averse agents may have a tendency to use
more fertilizer and pesticides than "risk-neutral agents., . ;
Before leaving theassue of risk estimation, a,comment is ^warranted about subsequent use of the
estimates. There may be a tendency on the part of modelers engaged in policy simulation to use
without qualification risk preference structures that were identified in previous research. Newbery
and Stiglitz (1981, p. 73) have shown that caution is warranted in accommodating the particular
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circumstances of the simulation exercise. One must ensure that the chosen risk preference structure is
consistent with reasonable levels of risk premia for theproblem at hand. The set of coefficients of
absolute risk aversion that give reasonable risk premia vary from problem to problem.
4.4. Econometric estimation of supply models with risk
One of the most widely agreed upon results, from the theory of the firm under price uncertainty is that
risk affects the optimal output level. Normally, the risk-averse producer is expected to produce less
than the risk-neutral producer, ceteris paribus, and the risk-averse producer will adjust output to
changing risk conditions (e.g., decrease production as risk increases). Econometric studies of
agricultural supply decisions have for a long time tried to accommodate these features of the theory of
the firm. There are essentially two reasons for wanting to do so: first, to find out whether the theory
is relevant, i.e., to "test" whether there is risk response in agricultural decisions; second, assuming
that the theory is correct and risk aversion is important, accounting for risk response may improve the
performance of econometric models for forecasting and/or policy evaluation, including welfare
measurement related to risk bearing.
To pursue these two objectives, a prototypical model is to write supply decisions at time t as
y, = Pq
where y denotes supply, fi denotes the (subjective) conditional expectation of price, denotes the
(subjective) conditional variance of price, x represents the vector of all othervariables affecting
decisions, e is a random term, t indexes observations, and parameters to be
estimated (/Sj is a vector). Clearly, this formulation simplifies theory to the bone by choosing a
particular functional form'and, more important, by postulating that mean and variance can adequately
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capture the risk facing producers. .Whereas more sophisticated models may be desirable, from an,
econometric point ofview equation (4.3) is already quite demanding. In.particular, the subjective
moments of the price distribution /i, and o*, "are unobserved, and thus to implement equation (4.3) it
is necessary to specify how these expectations are formed.
The specification of expectations for the first moment is a familiar problem in econometric
estimation. Solutions that have been proposed range from naive expectations models (where
fij = to adaptive expectations (where is a geometrically weighted average of all past prices),
to rational expectations (where is the mathematical expectation arrived at from an internally
consistentmodel of price formation, for example). A review of price expectations formation for price
levels is outside the scope of this chapter, but we note that, not surprisingly, parallel issues arise in
the context of modeling variance. Behrman (1968) allowed for price risk to affect crop supply in a
2
developing country by measuring Oj as a three-year moving average (but around the unconditional
mean of price). Similar ad hoc procedures have been very common in other studies, although often
with the improvement of a weighted (as opposed to simple) average of squared deviations from the
conditional (as opposed to unconditional) expectation of the price level-[e.g., Lin (1977); Traill
(1978); Hurt and Garcia (1982); Sengupta and Sfeir (1982); Brorsen, Chavas and Grant (1987);
Chavas and Holt (1990, 1996)]. A more ambitious and coherent framework was proposed by Just
(1974, 1976), whereby first and second moments of price are modeled to the same degree of
flexibility by extending Nerlove's (1958) notion of adaptive expectations to the variance of price.:
This procedure has been used in other studies, including Pope and Just (1991), Antonovitz and Green
(1990), and Aradhyula and Holt (1990). More recently, advances have been made by modeling the
time-varying variance within the autoregressive conditional-heteroskedasticity (ARCH) framework of
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Engle (1982), as in Aradhyula and Holt (1989, 1990), Holt and Moschini (1992), and Holt (1993).
The empirical evidence suggests that risk variables are often significant in explaining agricultural
production decisions. The early work by Just (1974), as well as some other studies, has suggested
that the size of this supply response to risk may be quite large, but the quantitative dimension of this
risk response is more difficult to assess because results are typically not reported in a standardized
manner. For example, an interesting question in the context of supply response concerns the size of
the likely output contraction dueto risk. As model (4.3) suggests, an approximate estimate of this
output reduction (in percentage terms) is simply given by the elasticity of supply with respect to the
price variance a^, but this basic statistic often is not reported. As a yardstick, however, we note that
for broiler production Aradhyula and Holt (1990) found a long-run price variance elasticity of -0.03,
whereas for sow farrowing, the comparable long-run elasticity estimated by Holt and Moschini (1992)
was -0.13.
Althoughsuch estimates may suggest a fairly sizeable production response to the presence of risk,
caution is in order for several reasons. First, as is often the case in applied economic modeling, these
empirical results are drawn from models that are based on individual behavior but that are estimated
with aggregate data without explicit consideration of aggregation conditions. Second, insofar as
producers use appropriate risk management procedures (see section 5), the conditional variance
typically used may not be measuring the relevant risk.^® Finally, estimating response to conditional
variance is inherently difficult. To illustrate this last point, consider the adaptive expectation .
approach that specifies the (subjective) conditional mean and the conditional variance as follows:
For example, a producer facing price risk and using futures contracts optimally to hedge risk
would be exposed only to residual basis risk, and conceivably that is what the variance terms should
measure.
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A=0 . , • ,
where usually X€ (0,1) and G (0,1). These parameterizations are appealing because they make
• * I'l ' ' * '
the unobservable variable a function of past redizations (which are, at least in principle, observable)
in a very parsimonious way:' It^is known that the assumption ofadaptive=expectations for the mean of
price is rather restrictive, and it turns out thafsiich'ah assumption for the variance is^even more
restrictive.
By definition, if fij denotes the agent's conditional expectation ofprice, then a price-generating
equation consistent with the agent's beliefs is Pi =fij +m,, where w, is a random term with a zero
conditional mean. Hence, an equivalent way' ofsaying that the producer's expected price is formed
adaptively as in equation (4.4) is to say'that the producer believes that price is generated by
• ' ' I r , , ' -
/), =p,.l - X«,.I + H, (4-6)
with E[Uj\Pf_{\ =0, where denotes the entire price history .up to.period M. Thus, adaptive
expectation for the conditional mean of price is equivalent to assuming that the agent believes that
price changes follow an invertible first-order moving-average process, a rather restrictive
condition.^^ •
Given that equation (4.6) is the relevant price model, the adaptive expectation model for the
variance of equation (4.5) can be rewritten as
See, for example, Pesaran.-(1987,,p. 19)..
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<r] =
Note that for the model to be internally consistent the agent must believe that the random terms are
drawn from a distribution with mean zero and variance . But, as is apparent from (4.7), for most
types of distributions (including the normal), is bound to converge to zero as time passes. Indeed,
equation (4.7) shows that the adaptive expectation model for conditional price variance is a special
case of Bollerslev's (1986) generalized ARCH (GARCH) model, specifically what Engle and
Bollerslev (1986) called the "integrated" GARCH model. For this model, almost surely for
most common distributions [Nelson (1990)].^® The fact that these models imply that aj-*0 leads
to the somewhat paradoxical situation of modeling response to risk with models that entail that risk is
transitory. As Geweke (1986, p. 59) stated, "... the integrated GARCH model is not typical of
anything we see in economic time series."
These undesirable modeling features are avoided if the conditional price variance is modeled by a
regular GARCH model, such as the GARCH(1,1) model:
a, = otQ + + oi2Uj_^,
(4.8)
2
where ag > 0 bounds the conditional variance away from zero (and thus precludes tr^^O), and
«! +Qiz < 1 ensures stationarity of the conditional variance process. This class of models, popular in
finance studies, has been applied to agricultural supply models by Aradhyula and Holt (1989, 1990),
Similar problems also apply to othermore ad hocparameterizations, such as that used by Chavas
and Holt (1990), where a] = and are predetermined constants satisfying ^ =1.
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Holt and Moschini (1992), Holt (1993), and others.. Whereas this approach offers a coherent
framework for modeling production response to risk, the GARCH.model makes explicit the relation
between conditional and imconditional variance and brings to the fore an important .feature ofthe
problem at hand. Namely, models such as (4.3) can identify response to v^iance only ifthe latter is
time-varying. If, on the other hand, producers perceive variance to be relatively constant, then no
response to risk can be estimated.- For example, in the logic of the model (4.8), a.constant variance
would unply that aj =0:2 =0, such that the conditional variance is the same as the unconditional
variance (ao» ^case), and the term P^ocq in equation (4.3) would then be absorbed by the
intercept.
We conclude this sectionwith two observations. First, the assumption that producers perceive a
constant conditional variance may not bea bad approximation. Most economic time series do seem to
display ARCH properties, but the ability to forecast squared errors is usually very limited even in
these models [Pagan and Schwert (1990)], and this is particularly true for the plaiming horizons
typical of agricultural production decisions [Hoit and Moschini (1992)]. Thus, in such cases
conditional variance does not do much better than unconditional variance for the purpose of
measuring the relevant risk; hence, identifying and estimating risk response may be too ambitious an
undertaking.^^ But second, the fact that we may have trouble identifying risk response does not
mean that production adjustments to risk are not present. Indeed, virtually any supply model that has
been estimated without a risk term is consistent with a potentially large risk response insofar as the
relevant risk is an unconditional variance that is captured by the intercept.
A related point is that, unlike typical finance applications, agricultural supply models with risk
are usually estimated with a small sample of observations.
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4.5. Risk and equilibrium in supply andproduction systems
The models that we have just reviewed introduce a risk variable as a single equation supply model.
As mentioned earlier, representing risk in terms of a single variable (say, price variance) may be
justified as an approximation to the more general EU model and will be an admissible procedure only
under cenain restrictive conditions (for example, normality and CARA). Whereas consideration of
higher moments has been advocated [Antle and Goodger (1984)], it is arguable that such ambitions
may be frustrated in most empirical applications. The single equation nature of these supply models,
on the other hand, can only be a partial representation of the more complete production and supply
system that may represent the agricultural producer's decision problem. Thus, generalizing risk
response models to systems of equations may be desirable, and it has been pursued by Coyle (1992),
Chavas and Holt (1990, 1996), and Saha, Shumway and Talpaz (1994), among others. Consideration
of such complete supply systems is common in applied work under assumptions ofcertainty or risk
neutrality, thanks partly to the popularization of flexible functional forms for dual representations of
technology (such as profit and cost functions), which greatly simplify the derivation ofcoherent
systems of output supply and input demand equations. Extension of this "dual" approach under risk
has been explored by Coyle (1992), but because his set-up relies on a linear mean-variance objective
function (which, as discussed earlier, is consistent with EU only under restrictive assumptions), it is
unclear whether this dual approach is better than the corresponding "primal" approach.
The system approach typically can accommodate such integrability conditions as symmetry,
homogeneity, and curvature (say, convexity in prices of the profit function). Interest in these
restrictions can arise for at least two reasons. First, this set of testable restrictions may be used to
validate the theoretical framework. Second, if testing the theory is not an objective, then maintaining
these restrictions may be useful in improving the feasibility/efficiency ofestimation, as well as
improving the usefulness of empirical results for policy and welfare analysis. If one wanted to
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consider the integrability conditions for EU maximizing producers, what would such conditions look
like? Pope (1980) pursued this question and showed that the simple symmetry and reciprocity
conditions that hold under certainty need not hold under uncertainty. But, as in any optimization
problem, some symmetry conditions must exist, and for the case ofa producer who maximizes
expected utility under price imcertainty, these conditions were characterized by Pope (1980), Chavas
and Pope (1985), and Paris (1989). In general the relevant symmetry conditions will involve wealth
effects (and thus will dependon risk attitudes). Restrictions on preferences, however, can reduce the
symmetry and reciprocity'conditions of the. riskraverse case to those of the certainty c^e. That will
happen, for example, if the utility function is of the GARA type [Pope (1980)]. Alternatively,
restrictions on the technology.can also reduce the symmetry-and reciprocity conditions of the risk-
averse case to those of the certainty case. •Specifically, if the production function is homothetic, then
input demands satisfy the symmetry, conditions that hold under certainty; and if the production
function is linearly homogeneous, then the corresponding reciprocity conditions also hold [Dalai
(1990)].
A fundamental restriction of output supply and input demand functions under certainty is that of
homogeneity of degree zero in prices. Thus, for example, if all input and output prices are scaled by
a constant (for instance, a change of units of measurement from dollars to cents), then all real
decisions are unaffected, i.e., there is no money illusion. In general the homogeneity property does
- ' . " I
not seem to hold under price uncertainty, as noted by Pope (1978) and Chavas and Pope (1985),
I
unless restrictions are placed on preferences. Because a proportional change in all input and output
prices induces a corresponding change in profit, the decisions of a producer with CARA preferences
are affected by such a proportional change. On the other hand, if the producer holds CRRA
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preferences, then decisions are not affected by such aproportional change in all prices.^^
Spelling out such homogeneity conditions is quite useful, and indeed Pope (1988) used
homogeneity to derive tests for the structure of risk preferences. But because homogeneity of degree
zero of choice functions in prices is typically associated with the absence of money illusion, the
conclusion that homogeneity need not hold under uncertaintymay seem somewhat puzzling. One way
to look at the problem is to recognize that the absolute risk-aversion coefficient is not unit-free; thus,
for example, it is meaningless to postulate a particular numerical value for Xindependent of the units
of measurement of prices. If doubling of all prices were associated with halving of X, for example,
then even under CARA choices would not be affected by such a change. There is, however, a more
fundamental way of looking at the homogeneity property. The crucial element here is to recognize
that the vNM utility function of money, say [/(tt), is best interpreted as an indirect utility function of
consumer demand, such that tt creates utility because it is used to purchase consumption goods.
Thus, U(7r) s V(p^,7r) where V(p^,Tr) is the agent's indirect utility function, and denotes the
price vector of consumption goods. In analyses of risk models, the vector is subsumed in the
functional C/(.) under the presumption that these prices are held constant. Because Vip^yV) is
homogeneous of degree zero in p^ and tt, it follows that, when consumption prices are explicitly
considered, the vNM utility function is homogeneous of degree zero in all prices (i.e., consumption
prices, output prices, and input prices). Thus, homogeneity (i.e., lack of money illusion) must hold
even under uncertainty, when this property is stated in this extended sense.
For example, if output and input prices are scaled by a constant A: > 0, then profit changes from
TT to kir. If utility is CARA, then - exp(X t) 7^ ~exp(-A:X tt) , because scaling prices by k is equivalent
to changing the constant coefficient of risk aversion. On the other hand, if utility is CRRA, say
U = log(7r), then scaling profit by k clearly has no effect on choices.
• 48
Storage opportunities introduce dynamics and require a,more careful accounting for equilibrium
issues as well as for expectation formation when modeling supply..Jn particular, because negative
storage is impossible, nonlinearities'are inherent in.the equilibrium problem. Using U.S. soybean
market data over the period 1960 to 1988, Miranda and Glauber ('1993) develop an equilibrium
rational expectations'model that explicitly represents the behavior ofproducers, consumers, and
storers (both private and public). Theyfind evidence to suggest that both acres supplied and storage
activities respond negatively to increased price risk. The storage result suggests that riskmanagement
institutions may facilitate.efficiency-by reducing impediments to intertemporal transactions.
^ . I .
4.6. Programming models with risk .> , • •
In a number of agricultural economics applications, especially those with a normative focus, risk has
been considered within suitably parameterized programming models that can readily.be solved (and
simulated) by appropriate computational methods.,-The classical quadratic programming problem of
Freund (1956) maximizes a weighted linear summation of mean and variance subject to resource
constraints:
Max pL{x) - i.XV(;i:) s.t. G{x) <0, (4.9)
AT 2
where ix{x) and V(a:) are mean and variance of returns as a function of choices, G{x) < 0 is a vector
of equality and inequality constraints, and Xmeasures the magnitude of risk aversion. Sharpe (1963),
among others, refined the approach into a convenient and economically meaningful single-index
model for portfolio choice. Applications of the method in agricultural economics include Lin, Dean
and Moore (1974) and Collins and Barry (1986); both of which consider land allocation decisions.
Because solving quadratic programming problems was, at one time, computationally difficult, Hazell
(1971) linearized themodel by replacing variance'of reward with themean of total absolute deviations
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(MOTAD) in the objective function. Hazeli's MOTAD model has been extended in several ways by
Tauer (1983), among others, and the general method has been used widely in economic analyses of
agricultural and environmental issues [Teague, Bernardo and Mapp (1995)]. Risk considerations can
also be introduced as a constraint, and many such programming problems go under the general rubric
ofsafety-first optimization as studied by Pyle and Tumovsky (1970) and Bigman (1996).^^
Given the strong relationship between time and uncertainty, risk has a natural role in dynamic
optimization problems. The analytical problems associated with identifying the time path of optimal
choices often requires numerical solutions for such problems. This is particularly true in agricultural
•and resource economics, where the necessity to accommodate such technical realities as resource
carry-over may preclude stylized approaches such as the real options framework discussed previously.
Stochastic dynamic programming is a discrete-time variant of optimal control methods and is robust to
accommodating the technical details of the rather specific problems that arise in agricultural and
natural resource economics. A standard such problem is:
T
Max s.t. =/(y,_i,Vi'^/)'
r=o (4.10)
yo given,
where Tmay be finite or infinite, /3 is the per-period discount factor, and Tr{Xj,yj) is the per-period
reward. The goal is to choose, at time 0, a contingently optimal sequence, a:o through Xj, to
maximize the objective function. But the problem is not deterministic because randomness, through
the sequence enters the carry-over equation, means that a re-
optimization is required at each point in the time sequence. To initialize the problem, it is necessary
Note that safety-first approaches to risk modeling may be difficult to reconcile with the EU
frariiework.
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that Jo be known. For analytical convenience. Markov chain propenies are usually assumed for the
stochastic elements of the model. Many variants of the above problem"can be constructed. For ,
example, time could modify the per'time period reward function or the carry-over function.
Applications of the approach include capital investment'decisions [Burt (1965)] and range stocking
rate and productivity enhanceinem'decisions [Karp and Pope (1984)].
4.7. Technology adoption, infrastructure and risk
Aclass of production decisions where risk is thought to play an imponant role is that of new
technology adoption. Early work in this area, reviewed by Feder, Just and Zilberman (1985), - .
analyzed the relationships among risk, fann size, and technology adoption, as well ,as the role of
information, human capital, and various market constraints affecting labor, credit, and land tenure. -
More recent studies that consider the possible impact of risk on adoption include Antle and Crissman
I » '
(1990) and Pitt and Sumodiningrat (1991)' "The availability of irrigation has been shown to be an
important risk factor for technology adoption. It both'increases average productivity and reduces
variability of output, and often involves community or government actions (thus emphasizing how risk
management opportunities may often depend'upon local instim'tional factors). For references to the
impacts of risk and irrigation on technology adoption, with special regard to the-adoption of high-
yielding but flood-susceptible rice in Bangladesh, see Azam (1996), Bera and Kelley (1990), and
other research cited therein. This line of research suggests that technologies are often best introduced
in packages rather than as stand-alone innovations. Other work on structure includes Rosenzweig and
Binswariger (1993), who studied the structural impacts of weather risk in developing countries, and
Barrett (1996), who considered the effects of price risk on farm sthicture and productivity. In the
context of hybrid maize adoption, Smale. Just and Leathers (1994) argue that it is very difficult to
disentangle the importance ofcompeting explanations for technology adoption, and suggest that
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previous studies may have overstated the imponance of risk aversion.
The introduction ofa new technology often requires a substantial capital investment, and so the
functioning of credit markets plays a crucial role. For collateral-poor farmers in rural communities of
the less developed world, credit is often unattainable through formal channels. For example, Udry
(1994) finds that in four northern Nigeria villages more than 95 percent ofborrowed funds were
obtained from neighbors or relatives. One ofthe reasons for the importance ofinformal lending
channels is the limited means by which formal credit providers can obtain relevant information
concerning the riskiness of projects. As discussed in Ray (1998), less formal sources (such as the
landlord, a local grain trader, or the village moneylender) are in a better position to judge risks and to
provide credit. But, perhaps due to high default risk or to the systemic nature of risk when all
borrowers are from the same village, interest rates are often very high. Bottomley (1975) developed
a simple model that relates equilibrium rates to default risk. It has been suggested that moneylender
market power may also affect rates but, from a survey of the literature, Ray (1998) concludes that
local moneylending markets tend to be quite competitive. However, as Bottomley (1975) pointed out,
the true interest rate may often bedifficult to ascertain because loans are often tied inwith other
business dealings such as labor, land lease, and product marketing agreements.
Faced with production and price risks, poorly performing credit markets would seem to imply
inadequate investments, perhaps especially in risk-reducing technologies. On the other hand, the
limited liability nature ofcredit may create incentives for borrowers to engage in riskier projects that
are, also less productive on the average, compared with the projects that would have been chosen if
the credit line were not available. Basu (1992) studies the effect of limited liability and project
substitution on the structure of land lease contracts.
5. Risk management for agricultural producers
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The purpose of risk rnanagement. is to control the possible adverse consequences of uncertainty that
may ahse from production decisions. Because of this inherently normatiye goal, staling the obvious
might yet be useful: risk management activities in general dp not seek,to increase proHts per se but
rather involve shifting profits from more favorable states of nature to, less favorable ones, thus
increasing the expected well-being of a-risk-averse individual. It should also be clear that production
and risk management activities'are inherently linked.. Most business decisions concerning production
have risk implications, and the desirability of-mostTisk management choices can only be stated
meaningfully with reference to aspecific production context. As fprthe.risk implications of
production decisions, .a useful classification of'inputs can be made following rEhrlich ^d Becker
(1972), who identified "self-insurance" and "self-protection" activities. Self-iiKurance, arises when a
decision alters the magnitude of a loss -given that the,.loss occurs. Self-protection takes .place, when a
decision alters the probability that a loss will occur Of course,-agriculmral inputs may .have both
self-insurance and self-protection attributes; forinstance, fertilizer may reduce both the probability
and conditional magnitude ofa crop nutrien^deficiency,?'! ^d livestock buildings can operate in the
sameway upon weather^related losses. Ehrlich and Becker (1972) use this classificauon to.show that
input choices modify-the demand for market insurance. .Expenditures on market insurance aiid self-
insurance substitute for each other, whereas expenditures on self-protection could actually increase the
demand for market insurance. ^ ^ ,
Abstracting from self-insurance and self-protection effects of production choices, farmers usually
have access to a number of other tools that have a more direct riskmanagement role. These include
contractual arrangements (e.g., forward sales, insurance contracts) as weil as the'possibiiity of "
. In a comprehensive reyiew of literature on crop yield variability determination,-Rouni^set et al.
(1989) conclude that nitrogen tends to increase variability. For technology adoption,, Antle and Crissman
(1990) suggest that variability tends to increase initially, but decrease again after more is learned about
the innovation. • , , . , • . ^ .
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diversifying their portfolio by purchasing assets with payoffs correlated with the returns on production
activities. Risk management decisions are obviously constrained by the given institutional and market
environments, i.e., what tools and programs are acmally available to the farmer. Thus, the possible
incompleteness of risk markets and the imperfections of capital markets are bound to be crucial to risk
management.25 ^e discussed in this section, existing risk markets, such as contingent price
markets and crop insurance, typically do not allow producers to eliminate all risk (for given
production choices, it may be impossible to take market positions such that the resulting total payoff
is invariant to the state of namre.) Whereas this may suggest scope for welfare-increasing
government intervention, it also indicates that farmers just may have to bear some residual risk.
Inwhat follows we analyze in some detail contracmal relationships that a producer may enter into
in order to manage price and quantity risk. Inpanicular. we emphasize price-contingent contracts
(forward, fumres and options) and crop insurance contracts. Whereas the analysis hopefully will
clarify the role ofvarious risk-management tools, we should emphasize that the results ofmost of the
models analyzed below do not translate into direct risk management recommendations. For example,
given the endogeneity of many of the risks faced by producers, adiscussion of risk management that
lakes production decisions as given is to some extent artificial, although it may be analytically useful.
More generally, one should keep in mind that farmers ultimately likely care about their consumption,
itself the result of an intertemporal decision. Risky production and risky prices of course imply a
25 When capital markets are imperfect, internal funding can be very important for production
decisions. For this reason, Froot, Scharfstein, and Stein (1993) argue that one of the main purposes of
hedging in abusiness is to manage cash flow so that profitable investment opportunities that arise might
be pursued, so that risk management has clear dynamic implications. The time sequence of cash flows
may also be important under the risk of business failure, as discussed by Foster and Rausser (1991).
From awelfare point of view, farmers may not be the main losers from market incompleteness.
Myers (1988) showed empirically that the incompleteness may benefit producers when food demand is
inelastic and may benefit consumers under other circumstances. Lapan and Moschmi (1996) in apartial
equilibrium framework, and Imies and Rausser (1989) and Imies (1990) in a general equilibrium
framework, identified roles for second-best policy interventions when some risk markets are missing.
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risky farm income, but such income uncenamty may not necessarily translate into consumption risk
because borrowing/saving opportunities, as well as income from other assets and/or activities
(diversification), may be used to smooth consumption over time. It is nonetheless instructive to
consider certain aspects of risk management in stylized models.
5.1. Hedging with price contingent contracts - ^ .
"Hedging" here refers to the purchasing of assets for the purpose of insuring one's wealth against
unwanted changes. As discussed earlier, output price is one of the most imponant sources of risk for
agricultural producers. Several instruments are available to farmers of developed countries to
"hedge" this price risk, notably forward contracts and price contingent contracts traded on organized
futures exchanges.
5.1.1. Forward contracts andfutures contracts
The biological lags that characterize agricultural production mean that inputs have to be committed to
production far in advance of harvest output being realized, at a time when output price is not known
with certainty. The simplest instrument often available to farmers to deal with this price risk is a
"forward contract." With such a contract a farmer and a buyer of the agricultural'output agree on
terms of delivery (including price) of the output in advance of its realization. For example, a farmer
and a buyer can agree that a certain amount of comwill be delivered at a given time during the
harvest season at the local elevator for a certain price. It is readily apparent that conditions exist
under which such a contract can completely eliminate price risk. To illustrate, let q ~.output quantity
produced, h= output quantity- sold by means of a forward contract, p = the output .price at the end of
the production period, /q= the forward price quoted at the beginning of the period, and tt = the
profit at the end ofthe period. Then the.random end-of-peripd profit .pf the firm that' uses forward
55
contracts is
TT =pq " C{q) + ^ ^
where C(q) is astrictly convex cost function (which subsumes the effects of input prices). '^' If the
farmer's utility function of profit is written [/(tt), where C/"(.) <0< U\.), the first-order
conditions for an optimal interior solution ofan EU maxiihizer require
(5.2)
U\ir){p-C\q))
U\^){fo-p)
= 0,
(5.3)
= 0,
from which it is apparent that optimal output q* must satisfy C\q *) -/q. This is the separatiori
result derived by Danthine (1978), Holthausen (1979), and Feder. Just and Schmitz (1980). Optimal
output depends exclusively on the forward price, which is known with certainty when inputs are
committed to production, and hence the production activity is riskless.
The importance of the separation result lies in the fact that the agent s beliefs about the
distribution of cash and futures prices, and her degree of risk aversion, are inconsequential for the
purpose of making production decisions. The agent's beliefs and her risk attitudes, however, may
affect the quantity of output that is sold forward. In particular, from (5.3) it follows that
/i" ? g" as e[p\ ^ /o-
< (5.4)
Thus, for example, aproducer who believes that the forward price is biased downward (i.e., .
E[p] >/o) has two ways of acting to take advantage of her information (i.e., "speculating ): she
2-^ Input prices are implicitly compounded to the end of the period using the (constant) market
interest rate, so that all monetary variables in (5.1) are commensurable.
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could produce more than under an unbiased forward price, while holding const^t the amount sold
forward; or she could decrease the amount sold forward, while.holding output at the level that is
optihial when the forward price is unbiased. Either action results in some uncoinmitted output being
available at harvest time that will fetch the (risky) market price. But speculating by varying output
has decreasing returns [because d'(q) >Oby assmnption], whereas speculating by varying the .
amount sold forward has constant retiims. Hence, speculation hbre takes place exclusively by varying
the amount sold forward'. Siihilarly, changes in risk aversion, and in^the riskiness of the price
distribution, in this setting affect forw^d sales but not j^roductipn decisioiK.
An extension of the results just discussed considers futures contracts instead of forward contracts.
••• , , i' ,1 , I i'
Afutures contract is, essentially, astandardized forward contract that is traded on an organized
exchange, such as the Chicago Board of Trade or the Chicago Mercantile Exchange [Williams
(1986)]. Afutures contract typically calls for delivery of agiven quantity (say, 5,000 bushels) of a
certain grade of acommodity (say. No. 2yellow corn) at aspecified delivery time (say, December of
agiven year) at aspecified location (say, apoint on the Mississippi River). Because of these
features, the futures price may not be exactly suited to hedge the risk of agiven producer. On the
other hand, fumres markets are quite liquid and hedging by using futures is readily possible for all
producers, even when alocal buyer offering aforward contract is not available. Using futures
contracts, a producer can lock in on aprice for future delivery; the problem, of course, is that this
precise futures price may not be what the producer needs. Such discrepancies may be due to any one
of the three main attributes of an economic good: form, time, .and space.^^ Because ofthat, the
For example, the commodity grown by the producer may be of a different kind (or a different
grade) than that traded onthe exchange; or, the producer may realize the output at a different time than
the delivery time of the contract;- or, the producer ihay realize the output at a different location than that
called for in the-futures contract. Grade differences may'be-handled by pre-specified premiums or
discounts over the futures price; differences in the type of commodity. lead to the problem of "cross-
hedging" of Anderson and Danthine (198^; see DiPietre and Hayenga (1982) for an application. The
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local cash price that is relevant for the producer is not the one that is quoted on the futures market,
although usually it is highly correlated with it. Inaddition, one should note that futures entail
lumpmess (only 5,000 bu. at a time for most grains, for example) as well as transactions costs. Thus,
relative to a forward contract, a futures contract is an imperfect (although possibly effective) risk-
reduction instrument, i.e., the producer that uses futtires contracts retains "basis risk."
To illustrate hedging under basis risk, let us modify the notation of the previous section by letting
/o= fumres price quoted at the beginning ofthe period, /= fiimres price at maturity of the fumres
contract, and h = amount of commodity sold in the futures market. As before, p represents the cash
price at harvest time, and thus basis risk means that, typically, p 7^ }• In general, it is difficult to
fully characterize the production and hedging decisions under basis risk. Some results may be
obtained, however, by restricting the relationship between cash and futures prices to be linear, as in
Beiminga, Elder and Zilcha (1983):
o ? s (5.5)p = a + /3/+ 0,
where a and j3 are known constants, and 0 is a zero-mean random term that is independent of the
futures price.^^ The end-of-period profit of the producer can then be represented as
ir =(a +(3/o 4. e)q - Ciq) +(fo -f){h -0q)-
imperfect time hedging problem was explicitly addressed by Batlin (1983).
29 Basis in this context refers to the difference, at the date ofsale, between the (local) cash price and
futures price.
30 Actually, whereas independence is sufficient for our purposes, the slightly weaker assumption that
/ is conditionally independent of 0is both necessary and sufficient [Lence (1995)]. Of course, for some
distributions (such as the multivariate normal) these two notions of independence are equivalent. Indeed,
if f) are jointly normally distributed, then the linear basis representation in (5.5) follows.
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Now, if the futures price is unbiased (i.e., if E[f\ =/o)v it is apparent that, for any given output q,
the optunal futures hedge is h* = Additional results for this basis'risk case are presented in
Lapan, Moschini and Hanson (1991). Because in this case random profit reduces to
TT =(a +/3/o +e)g - C{q), the.effective (hedged) price, a + +e, is still random. Hence, under
risk aversion, production takes place,at a point at which marginal cost is lower than the expected
price (given optimal hedging), i.e.,' C\q *)< (a +P/q), indicating that, a ponion ofprice risk due to
the basis cannot be hedged away. Because there is some residual uncertainty concerning the local •
cash price, the degree of risk aversion also influences optinial output. Specifically, the output level
^ * is inversely related to the degree of risk aversion, as in earlier results of models of the
competitive firm under price risk [Baron (1970); Sandmo (1971)]. Also, a ceteris paribus increase in
nondiversifiable basis uncertainly (amean-preserving spread of ^) will in general decrease the optimal
output level, a sufficient condition being that preferences satisfy DARA [Ishii (1977)]..
It is important to realize that with basis risk,, even in its special formulation of equation (5.5), the
separation result, discussed earlier for the case of forward contracts, does not apply. Because
hedging does not eliminate basis risk, if the agent believes that the futures pricejs biased then her
choice will involve the possibility of investing in two risky assets (production of output and trading in
futures). Thus, if the agent believes that the futures price is biased, her optimal speculative response
will entail changes in both these risky assets. For the special case of CARA preferences and of a
linear basis as in (5.5), however, one can still prove a separation result between production and
Hence, the optimal futures hedge ratio h* /q is equal to /3 =Cov(/>,7)/Var(/), the coefficient
of the theoretical regression of c^h price on futures price, a result that has been used in countless
empirical applications. '
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hedging (speculative) decisions. Specifically, in such acase the optimal output level q does not
depend on the parameters of the producer's subjective distribution of fumres prices [Lapan, Moschini
and Hanson (1991)], although it does depend on the agent's degree of risk aversion and on the
parameters a and /3, which define the expectation of the cash price (conditional on the futures price).
The results just outlined pertain to a static problem and, more crucially, pertain to a competitive
producer who faces only price risk. For most commodities, however, the hedging problem needs to
consider the fact that farmers typically are exposed to both price and production uncertainty. An
early attempt at allowing both price and production risk was that of McKinnon (1967), who
considered the hedging problem ofminimizing the variance ofprofit for a given planned output level.
Because of the complications generated by the joint presence of price and production risk, efforts to
extend McKinnon's risk-minimization analysis to EU maximization often have relied on the
assumption that producers maximize an objective function increasing in the mean and decreasing in
the variance of revenue/profit. This approach was followed by Rolfo (1980), Newbery and Stiglitz
(1981, chapter 13), and Anderson and Danthine (1983), among others. In these studies it is shown
that the correlation between the random production and random price is crucial for determining the
optimal hedging strategy. Because demand considerations suggest the correlation is typically
negative, a "natural" hedge is already built into the price system and the optimal strategy is to hedge
an amount lower than expected output.
Such amean-variance approach usually is justified on the grounds that it is exact for a CARA
utility function if wealth/profu is normally distributed. But profit typically is not normally distributed
when output is uncertain because it entails the product of two random variables [Newbery (1988)].
Indeed, the need to analyze our hedging problem in ageneral framework is clearly illustrated by
noting that, under production uncertainty, the optimal hedge in general is less than expected output
even when output and price are independent [Losq (1982)], aresult that camiot be established by
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mean-variance analysis. Of course,-the difficulty is that it is not possible to establish useful general
hedging results that hold for arbitrary concave utility functions and arbitrarily jointly distributed
random prices and quantities. If one assumes a CARA utility function, however, an exact solution to
the hedging problem under production uncertainty may be possible, as illustrated by Bray (1981),
Newbery (1988), and Karp (1988).
A model that captures the essence of a typical farmer's planting hedge was presented in Lapan
and Moschini (1994), who consider fiinires hedging for a competitive producer who faces both
production (yield) and price risk and whose only available hedging instrument is a futures contract
(with basis risk). Following Newbery and Stiglitz (1981), stochastic putput is represented in terms of
a production function with multiplicative risk, i.e., Q = , where x denotes the vector of inputs,
y is a random variable with mean y, and Q is random output. As noted earlier, with multiplicative
production risk, input choices can still be represented by a standard cost function, say Ciq) where q
denotes the scale of production.^^ With input prices assumed constant (they are typically known at
the time production and hedging decisions are made) and subsumed in the function C(.). realized total
profits are^^
TT = pyq - C(q) + (/q - f)h. , (5.7)
Thus, the producer knows /q when q and h are chosen, but the reali^tions of the random variables
{f^P^y} are not known. The difference between / and p reflects basis risk.
32
j ' . r .
Thus, for any level of inputs, q=q(xj. •In'this setting, q aggregate's planted acreage and other
inputs, and y reflects random yield.
33 Of course, simultaneous use of crop insurance contracts (discussed later) would alter the nature
of this problem. ' • .v
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Within this context, and assuming that producers maximize a CARA utility, and that the three
random variables {/.p.j?} are jomtly nonnally distributed, Lapan and Moschini (1994) derive and
discuss the exact analytic solution to the optimal hedging problem. In panicular, they show that the
optimal ftimres hedge satisfies
- *^12 - ^13
y ^ P
*^11
(5.8)
Here are the elements of the matrix S= +V~^]~ , where Xis the coefficient of absolute
risk aversion, Vis the variance-covariance matrix of the three random variables, and B is an
accounting matrix ofzeros and ones. Hence, an important result here is that the optimal hedge does
depend on the degree of risk aversion, even when the futures price is perceived as unbiased. This
insight was not present in earlier mean-variance models of hedging under production uncertainly
[e.g., Rolfo (1980); Newbery and Stiglitz (1981)]. For likely parameter values, this risk preference
effect may be important and the optimal hedge may differ substantially from the mean-variance one.
Furthermore, the optimal hedge under yield uncertainty depends on the conditional forecast of the
harvest price (p) and of the yield term (y), even when the futures price is perceived as unbiased.
Thus, in addition to precluding the separation result, production uncertainty also entails that the
optimal hedge is inherently time-varying because conditional forecasts will be revised as harvest
approaches.
The empirical application reported by Lapan and Moschini (1994), based on ageneralization of
Myers and Thompson's (1989) hedge ratio estimation procedure, showed that the optimal hedge is
considerably less than the full hedge, and that the amount sold forward declines as risk aversion
increases. Of course, CARA, joint normality, and multiplicative production risk are rather restrictive
assumptions, but nonetheless this model is useful because it can relax the straitjacket of the mean-
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variance framework and provide insights into thie EU-maximizing optimal hedge.' Although analytical
results based on more general iassumptiohs are difficult to obtain, empirically it is easy to consider
alternative risk preference structures and stochastic distributions-. For example, Lapan and Moschini
(1994) solve numerically' for the optimal hedge for CRRA preferences and log-normally distributed
{f,p,y], and find that the conclusions obtained under CARA and normality are reasonably robust.^
5.7.2. Options on futures
' 'l I j •
Among the instruments traded oncommodity exchanges, futures contracts arguably have the most
direct relevance to riskmanagement for farmers. With the introduction of options on fumres for
many commodities in the 1980s, however, the possibility of trading "put and call options has attracted
r •'
considerable attention.^^ The use of'options as hedging devices when the producer faces only price
(and basis) risk (but not production risk) was considered by Lapari, Moschini and Hanson (1991).
They emphasize that the inclusion of commodity options in a decision maker's portfolio'leads to a
violation of the two main conditions for a mean-variance representation of expected utility:' (i) options
truncate the probability distribution of price (so tifiat the argument of the utility function, profit or
wealth, is not normally distributed even if the random price is normal), and (ii) the use of options '
generally means that the argument of utility is not monotonic in the random! attributes. ' The model
essentially emails adding another hedging instrument (options) to the payoff in equation (5.7). A
Whereas the discussion here has emphasized price-contingent cbhtracts, some yield futures have
recently been introduced by the Chicago Board of Trade. Clearly, such contracts are potentially useful
for farmers (provided enough liquidity exists). Amean-variance analysis'of the hedging problem with
bothprice and yield futures is presented by Vukina, Li, and Holthausen (1996).
35 IA "put" conveys to the buyer the right to sell the underlying futures contract at a given price (the
"strike price"). This right can be exercised over a certain period of time (the life ofthe option), and for
this right the buyer must pay a "premium'' (the price;of the option) to the seller (the underwriter).
Similarly, a "call" conveys to the buyer-the right to:sell the underlying futures aMhe, strike price during
the life of the option. SeeCox and Rubinstein (1985) for more details.
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basic modeling issue here is that, given the presence of futures, one of these basic types of options is
redundant (for example, aput can always be constructed using afutures and acall). Hence, for
modeling purposes attention can be limited to any two of the three types of assets (futures, puts, and
calls). Equivalently, as emphasized by Lapan, Moschini and Hanson (1991). one can consider futures
and acombination of puts and calls such as straddles.^^ The use of futures and straddles is fully
equivalent to allowing the use of futures and calls (or puts), but it has the analytical advantage of
illuminating the interpretation of anumber of results because the payoff of astraddle is essentially
onhogonal to the payoffof a fiimres contract.
Lapan, Moschini and Hanson (1991) show that, when the futures price is unbiased (from the
producers' own point of view), then options are redundant hedging instruments. The key insight here
is that, unlike futures contracts, options allow the construction of payoffs that are nonlinear in the
realized futures price. But when futures prices and options premiums are perceived as unbiased (such
that the only reason to trade these instruments is to hedge the risky cash position), the relevant payoff
of the producer is linear in the futures price. Hence, the optimal hedging strategy involves using only
fumres contracts, which provide apayoff that is linear in the price of interest (the option payoff is
uncorrelated with the risk that remains after the optimal futures hedge). If futures prices and/or
options premiums are perceived as biased, however, then there is aspeculative motive to trade futures
and options, and options are typically used along with futures.
In this context ii is clear that a hedging role for options is likely when there is a nonlmear relation
between profit and the futures prices, such as the presence of nonlinear basis risk or the presence of
production uncenainty together with price uncertainty. The latter situation is obviously of great
interest to farmers, and has been analyzed by Moschini and Lapan (1995). They study the problem of
36 A(short) straddle can be constructed by selling one call and one put at the same strike price (or,
because of the redundancy just memioned, it can be constructed by buying one futures and selling two
calls).
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afanner with end-of-period profit given by . ;• ^-
. • • -(5.9)
X=pyq - C{q) +[fo - f)^ + ~ ~
where zis ashort straddle with strike price kand premium r(note that the payoff of the straddle
depends on the absolute value of the difference between realized fumres price and strike price). The
producer knows /o. and rwhen and zare chosen, but the realizations, of the rando. variables
{f,p,y} are not known. Under the assumption of CARA and normality, Moschini and Lapan (1995)
provide analytic solutions for the optimal use of fiitures and straddles. If toures and options prices
are perceived as unbiased, then the optimal hedging strategy entails selling fiitures and buying
straddles. Of course, because of the simultaneous presence of price and production uncertamty; the
optimal use of the hedging instruments depends on the agent's degree of risk aversion, and in general
the optimal hedge is less than the full hedge. For example, for arepresentative soybean producer
with alocal relative risk aversion of R=2. and after tr^lating optimal levels of fumres and
straddles into futures and puts, the optimal hedge is to sell fuiures in an amount of about 63 percent
of the expected output and to buy puts in an amount of about 15 percent of expected output.
If the producer perceives the fiitures and straddle prices as being biased, then there is a
speculative motive to trade these assets. An interesting result here is that, if the agent perceives only
the options price to be biased, then only the straddle position is affected, whereas if only the futures
price is perceived as biased, both fumres and options positions will be affected." This result is
reminiscent of the speculative hedging role of options illustrated by Lapan, Moschini and Hanson
(1991, 1993), and in particular, cannot be obtained by using the special mean-variance framework.
" Thus, options are usehil to provide insurance against the risk of speculating on the fiitures price
because the nonlinearity of their payoffs can compensate for the speculation outcome of extreme price
realizations. But fiimres are not useful to hedge the speculative risk induced by the optimal option use
under biased option prices.
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5.J.3. The timepattern ofhedging
The discussion so far has dealt with a simple version of the hedging problem, aone-period (two-
dates) model. At the begiiming of the period, when the risky cash position is incurred (say, when
com is planted or when feeder cattle are bought and placed in the feedlot), the farmer hedges by
trading fumres and other derivatives (options). At the end of the period, when the cash position is
liquidated (because the crop is harvested or the cattle are sold), the financial positions are closed. But
what if the farmer were free to adjust the futures hedge after it is established and before it is closed?
Two questions are relevant here. Does the possibility of revising the optimal hedge affect the initial
hedging decision? And, if it is optimal to revise the hedge over time, how is the hedge revised?
These problems have been addressed, in different contexts, by (among others) Anderson and Danthine
(1983), Karp (1988), and Myers and Hanson (1996). It turns out that the answer to these questions
depends crucially, among other things, on whether the producer believes that futures prices are biased
or unbiased, and on whether or not there is production uncertainty in the model.
Because our focus is on risk reduction (hedging), suppose that futures prices are unbiased. Also,
consider first the pure price and basis risk case (no production risk), and suppose that there are T
periods, with the initial hedge being taken at /=0, and the last hedge being lifted at f=r. and that
the terminal profit of the producer is
=pjQ + (1+0^ '(// "/f-i)Vi ' (5.10)
r=l
where i is the per-period interest rate. If the producer maximized the EU of terminal profit,
optimal hedging problem (for any given level of output q) can be solved by
backward induction. Suppose first that i=0 and that the linear basis assumption made earlier is
rewritten as
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Pr=cL^&fj*eT. ' ' ' ' "
Then, it is easily shown that the optimal hedge is to sell an amount h* = for all r=0 7-1.
Thus, if futures prices are unbiased, the static optimkl hedge solution gives the optimal hedging
strategy at any time based upon the conditional moments available at that time. In particular, the
myopic hedging rule (i.e., the hedge that does not take into account thai later revisions in the hedge
positions are possible) is the same as the optimal dynamic hedging strategy [Karp (1988)].
Because profits/losses of the futures position are marked tomarket in equation (5.10), if the'
interest rate is positive then the optimal fumres'hedge at time t should be adjusted by a' factor of
(1 +0^"'. This gives a first, albeit trivial, reason for the pure hedge to change as time t moves from
j ^
0 to r, as the amount sold forward will increase over time because of this pure discounting effect.
As harvest approaches, the agent may revise her expectations about futures (and therefore cash) prices
at T. However, there would be no need to adjust the futures position through the growing season due
to these, changed price expectations, provided the farmer continued to believe that the futures price
was unbiased. A second reason to revise the hedge position arises if the moments of the distribution
of cash and futures prices (for time T) change over time (as a result of new information), in which
case the optimal hedge will be revised as time progresses from t to T. as illustrated by Myers and
Hanson (1996). Furthermore, in that situation the ability to revise the futures hedge does affect the
initial (at time t =0) hedge position, so thatmyopic and optimal dynamic hedges differ.
As illustrated by Anderson and Danthine,(1983), Karp (1988), and Lapan and Moschini (1994),
production uncertainty gives yet another fundamental reason for the optimal hedge to change over
time. Because production uncertainty implies that the futures market cannot provide a perfect hedge,
the hedge itself depends on the agent's forecast of realized cash price (realized futures price) and
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realized yield, even when the futures price is unbiased [recall equation (5.8)]. Clearly, changes in
expectations of realized yields (and hence output) will lead to revisions in the futures position. Even
if yield forecasts do not change, however, changes in the futures price (and therefore in the expected
cash price) will lead to changes in the optimal hedge if the realizations of yields and price are
correlated.
Asomewhat different dynamic hedging problem arises when the production setting allows for
some inputs to be chosen after the uncenaimy is resolved, as in the ex-post flexibility models of
Hanman (1976) and Epstein (1978). This hedging problem has been studied by Moschini and Upan
(1992), who emphasize that in this model the ex-ante profit ofthe firm is nonlinear (convex) in the
risky price (hence, once again, the mean-variance framework is unlikely to be very useful unless one
is willing to assume that the utility function is quadratic). They derive a special case of the separation
result for this instance of production flexibility (.without basis and production risk, ofcourse), which
attains when the shadow price of the quasi-fixed input (the input that is chosen ex-ante) is linear in the
output price. This linearity means that the incremental risk due to changes in the quasi-fixed inputs
can be fully hedged using futures (because the payoff of the futures position is also linear in price).
The nonlinearity of profit in the risky price, however, means that all income risk cannot be hedged
via futures for the case ofproduction flexibility, and thus there is a pure hedging role for options,
over and above that of futures.
5.1.4. Hedging and production decisions
The hedging review so far has emphasized the optimal use of hedging instruments conditional on a
given output or agiven expected output. An important but distinct question concerns how the
availability of these hedging opportunities affects the firms' choice of output. As mentioned earlier,
in the special case where basis risk and production risk are absent, the availability of futures contracts
68
allows a separation between production and hedging, (speculative) decisions. Specifically, the futures
price determines the optimal output level, irrespective of the subjectiye beliefs of the producer, and
any difference between the agent's price.expectations.and the prevailing futures price, only affects the
hedging/speculative position. Even in this simple case, however, whether the hedging opportunity
increases output depends crucially on whether the futures price is biased or not. If the futures price is
perceived as unbiased, then the availability offiinires.hedging induces the risk-averse firm to expand
output. •
When we relax the restrictive assumptions that lead to the separation result, and allow for basis
and production risk (in addition to futures price risk), ingeneral the,planned output of the risk-averse
firm will depend on both the futures .price and price expectations. The question of how, hedging .
affects the choice of planned output, therefore, is only meaningful in the context of unbiased prices,
but even in this context it-.tums out that general propositions are not possible. Some insights,
however, are provided, by Moschini and Lapan (.1995) for the case of jointly normally, distributed
random variables and GARApreferences. In particular, they show that if the level of risk aversion is
small or if the orthogonal production risk is sufficiently small and the futures price is unbiased, then
the availability of futures hedging induces the risk-ayerse firm .to produce a larger output level.
Essentially, the ability to hedge effectively changes,(increases) the risk-adjusted.price the firm
perceives for its output. Similarly, it is. shown that, if the degree of risk aversion or the,level of pure
production risk is not too large and futures and option prices are unbiased, then the availability of
options (in addition to futures) also causes the firm to increase output.
5.1.5. The value of hedging to farmers
Whereas the foregoing curso '^, review suggests a potentially important role for ftimres and option
I I *
contracts to manage farmers* risk, empirical surveys often find that use of such contracts by farmers
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is limited.^® Many explanations for tliis situation have been offered. From apurely economic point
of view, it is clear that existing futures markets do not complete the set of markets in the Arrow-
Debreu sense, and thus fumres are imlikely to provide a full hedge in a number ofproduction
situations. For example, as discussed earlier, consideration of basis and other risks may substantially
affect (typically reduce) the optimal fumres hedge. Furthermore, even abstracting from basis and
other risks, one may note that the time horizon ofexisting futures is limited (i.e., the most distant
delivery date for agriculmral futures is often little beyond one year). Thus, producers who hedge
optimally their one-period risk are still exposed to some intertemporal price risk even after accounting
for "rollover" hedging [Gardner (1989); Lapan and Moschini (1996)].
From amore practical viewpoint, certain costs ofhedging that are typically neglected in the
analysis, such as brokerage fees, initial deposit, and the requirement to mark to market, may deter
hedging activities. Lence (1996) argues that such costs may make the net benefits of hedging almost
negligible and may help explain why many farmers do not hedge. Also, limited use of futures by
farmers may, to acertain extent,' result from mistrust and lack of proper education on the working of
such instruments, an observation that suggests a clear scope for extension activities. But one should
also keep in mind that the fumres markets may be indirectly quite important for agriculmral risk
management even when many farmers do not use futures contracts directly. For example, futures
may be routinely used by country elevators to hedge the risk of storing grain, and these elevators may
in turn offer forward contracts to farmers.
But a recent survey [U.S. General Accounting Office (1999)] finds that use of risk-management
tools by farmers is actually fairly common in the United States. In 1996, 42 percent of the United States
iwo millions farmers used one ormore risk management tool, and use ofrisk management strategies was
even more frequent for larger farms. For example, among farmers with annual sales greater than 5.
100,000, 55 percent used forward contracts and 32 percent engaged in hedging with fumres and/or
options ^2 percent of these farmers also purchased crop insurance, arisk management tool discussed
below).
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5.2. Crop insurance ' ' ' ' '
Given the susceptibility of crop yields to weather fluctuations, there is obviously alatent demand for
crop insurance. Although crop insurance markets have existed for a,long time in some pans of the
world (e.g., the United States, Canada, and Sweden), their existence has depended crucially on
government support, ^d these governments often have seen fit to subsidize or even run crop
insurance markets. Unsubsidized private insurance markets for agricultural risks have been confined
mostly to single-peril insurance contracts. Wright^and Hewitt (1990) express the belief that private
agriculmral insurance markets may fail because the costs of maintaining these markets imply
unacceptably low average payouts relative to premiums". Furthermore, they suggest,that the perceived
for crop insurance may be overstated because farmers can use diversification and savmgs to
cushion the impact of apoor harvest on consumption-:. Although Wright and Hewitt's conjectures are
solidly motivated, little has been done to.verify the claims einpirically. It seems clear, however, that
unsubsidized agriculmral insurance may not be attractive to farmers because it may be too costly. In
particular, the costs of private insurance contracts arise, in part, from information problems that are
inherent in these insurance contracts, and it is to these problems that we now turn.
Almost invariably crop insurance markets that have benefited from government intervention,
especially for multiple-peril contracts, have been either unexpectedly costly to maintain or unattractive
to producers, or both. Consider, for example, the case of the U.S. Federal Crop Insurance
Corporation (FCIC), which subsidizes insurance for U.S. crop growers. Below is a table of acreage
participation rates and loss ratios for some of the major grain and oilseed crops over the ten-year
period 1987 to 1996. The loss ratio is the ratio of indemnities to premium payments, and does not
include premium subsidies.When one notes that loss ratios of no more than 0.7 are deemed
necessary for unsubsidized insurance to be viable given the administrative costs of running it [Wright
In addition to subsidizing premiums, the FCIC also absorbs the administrative costs.
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(1993)], it is clear that the acreage premia would have to be raised substantially for the program to be
self-sustaining. Even so, despite heavy government involvement, the subsidized programs are
insufficiently generous to attract even amajority of acres planted to these crops. Indeed, the reponed
participation rates are artificially high because in 1989 and some subsequent years producers had to
sign up to be eligible in the event of ad hoc relief, and in 1995 producers had to sign up in order to
be eligible for very attractive target price programs. Knight and Coble (1997) provide adetailed
overview ofthe multiple-peril crop insurance environment since 1980. Given that a good insurance
policy should attract decision makers who are willing to lose money on average in order to have a
less variable income, it is obvious that the FCIC programs have left much, to be desired.
Table 5.1. FCIC Coverage and Payouts 1987—1996.
Crop U.S. Acres Planted
(Millions)
Acres that are FCIC Insured
(Percent)*
Loss Ratio*
Wheat 71.0 46.8 1.53
Com 73.6 38.3 1.22
Soybeans 59.9 35.3 1.06
Sorghum 11.4 37.9 1.37
Barley 8.9 44.0 1.44
Rice 2.9 29.5
2.42
' Averages reponed are the annual numbers averaged over 10 years.
Sources: United States Department ofAgriculture (1996) and Federal Crop Insurance
Corporation (1997).
Not the least of the problems that arise in crop insurance markets is the existence of astrong
political imerest in their perceived success. Although the political aspects of these markets are many
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and varied, the following provides a flavor. Just as in the United Stales, government involvement in.
Piinariian crop insurance markets has' been both extensive and of questionable success. One of the
precursors to crop insurance in Canada was the 1939 (federal) .^tairie-Farm Assistance Act. In the
words ofthe Minister ofAgriculture at the time, and referring.to^a long-standing federal policy of
encouraging the settlemem of.the Prairie provinces, the act ... is intended to take care of people
who were put on land that they should never have been put on. That is our reason for being in this at
all, and it is our reason for paying two-thirds or three-quarters of the costs out of the treasury of
Canada (Standing Committee onAgriculmre and Colonization)." Sigurdson and Sin (1994) provide a
description of the political history ofCanadian crop insurance policy, and Gardner (1994) gives an
overview of the United States crop insurance policy in relation to other agriculmral policies.
In the United States, one of the more important political aspects of crop insurance is the
unwillingness of the federal government to ignore the pleas for monetary disaster assistance whena
crop failure is widespread. Given that farm-level crop failures tend to be strongly positively
correlated, this undermines the incentive to purchase crop insurance. Disaster assistance is an
example of one economic problem—moral hazard—that afflicts crop insurance markets.
When considering a risk, insurance companies may observe certain parameters of the decision
environment such as geographic location, soil type, and yield history. They may also observe certain
actions such as input use. It is often infeasible to observe all relevant facts, however, and even if
observable it may be impossible to write an insurance contract based upon these observations. When
it is impossible or excessively costly to write a contract based upon relevant actions, then moral
hazard problems may arise. Similarly, when contracts based upon relevant environmental parameters
are infeasible, then adverse selection problems may arise. In the remainder of this section, we
delineate the nature of the two major economic incentive problems that impede well-functioning crop
insurance contracts, and we discuss possible remedies to these problems.
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5.2.1. Moral hazard
Arisk-neutral insurer who is contemplating the business of a risk-averse producer will seek to specify
acontract payout schedule, net of premium, such that aprofit is made on the average and also that
the producer finds the contract to be sufficiently attractive to sign. Using astandard principal-agent
model, as in Chambers (1989), let Rbe gross revenue and let I(R) be the net contract payoff schedule
(premium minus payout), with C[/(i?)] as the cost of administering that payoff schedule. Then,
assuming symmetric information, i.e., that the insurer can contract upon observable input choices, the
insurer's problem is
Max
x.I(R)
{/(i?) - C[/(i?)]}^f^="(i?|Jc) s.t. f C/[i? - I(R) - rx]rfF(i?|x) > u, (5.12)
where R is supponed on [a,b], u is the minimum level ofexpected utility that must be maintained to
entice the producer to insure, F(R\x) is the revenue distribution function conditional on the input
vector X, and r is the input price vector.
Standard analysis, due to Borch (1962), yields the requirement that I{R) satisfy the point-wise
condition
1 - _ (5.13)
where is the Lagrange multiplier for the EU constraint in problem (5.12). Now, if the insurer's
cost is invariant to the nature of the schedule, then optimality requires UJ^t] to be constant, and so
for risk-averse producers I{R) must be such that R- I{R) - rx is constant. This is the classical risk-
sharing result, namely that the risk-neutral insurer should accept all risk from the risk-averse
producer. Under general conditions, this result continues to hold if the insurer is risk averse but
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contracts upon a large number ofindependent.risks.^ .Because the insurer here .assimies all the
risk, and given the participation constraint, then I(R) =R - rx -U H"] • optimal x,is that
which maximizes the producer's expected profit.'*^
This set-up is drastically changed, and moral hazard problems arise, when the insurer contracts on
a risk-averse producer whose inputs are unobservable (i.e., there is asymmetric information). This is
because the insurer has but one instrument, the payoff schedule, to address two goals.'To be'
attractive a contract must mitigate the uncertainty facing insurers, but to'make a profifthe contract'
must ensure that producers do not take advantage of the limited control over irisur^cepayoffs that
arise from the insurer's inability to observe input iise.' The insurer's problein when inputs are not
observable, but the stochastic technology F(R\x) is known, can be stated as "
Max
l(R)
r{I(R) - C[I{R)]}dF{R\x)^ ; SJ. .. f I{R) - rx]dF{R\x) > u,
(5.14)
f b , .
x' - argmax ^ V[R ->I{R)-rx]dF{R\x).
The additional incentive .coinpatibiiity constraint ensures that the rational insurer endogenizes the input
consequences of the payoff schedule posed. For both problems (5.12) and (5.14), in general the
participation constraint is binding, and the producer achieves utility level u. Under moral hazard,
however, it is not optimal for the risk-neutral principal to assume all risk. Some residual risk must
' • • • ' ' .. I
be borne,by the (risk-averse) producer and hence, to achieve a given «, the expected payouts to the
producer have to be larger than under symmetric information. Chambers (1989) discusses the welfare
^ Unfortunately, risks across crop production units usually tend to be more systematic than
idiosyncratic in nature. •> \ •
the trivial'Case where inputs are unobservable but the.producer is risk neutral, this expected,
profit-maximizing result may also be achieved by setting the schedule I{R) equal to a constant. In this
way, the producer faces.all-the consequences of:the actions taken. .But.then,--of course, the insurance
company serves no purpose and will never be able to cover any administrative costs.
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loss associated with the incentive constraint as well as the possibility that itmight cause crop
insurance markets to fail.
The implications of the moral hazard problem are not as clear-cut as intuition might suggest.
Being relieved of some of the consequences of low input use, the producer may reduce input
intensity. On the other hand, as previously shown, if input use is risk increasing then ahigh-risk
environment may cause the producer to use fewer inputs than a lower-risk environment. Thus the
existence ofinsurance may, in mitigating risk, encourage input use. That is. risk sharmg and moral
hazard effects may oppose each other.
To model econometrically the moral hazard problem, the crop producer contemplating whether to
insure may be viewed as having to make two decisions: whether or not to insure, and the choice of
input vector. In one of the first econometric analyses of the effects of crop insurance, Horowitz and
Lichtenberg (1993) assumed that the decision to insure affects input use but not the other way around.
Modeling the insurance decision by Probit analysis and modeling input choice as a linear regression
on the insurance decision, among other regressors, they smdied com production decisions in ten Com
Belt states and concluded that the decision to insure increased significantly the use of nitrogen and
pesticides. These results are somewhat surprising, so other researchers sought to confirm the
conclusions on different data sets and using other methodologies. Smith and Goodwin (1996)
estimated asimultaneous equations model of input use and crop insurance purchases for Kansas
dryland wheat farmers, and concluded that insurance and input decisions are likely simultaneously
determined. Further, their results suggest that insurance reduces the use of agricultural chemicals.
Estimating an input^conditioned beta distribution for farm-level Iowa com production, Babcock and
Hennessy (1996) simulated optimal input use under different types and levels of insurance for risk-
averse producers and also concluded that insurance would likely decrease input use. Although more
empirical investigations are warranted, it would appear that risk sharing through crop insurance
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reduces input use. - • • •- • j.- •, •:<
The moral hazard problem was also smdied in the West African Sahel region, which is at risk to
drought. Followmg on work by Hazell (1992), among others, Sakurai and Reardon (1997) identified
quite strong potential demand for area-level rainfall insurance. Their analysis also raises the concern
that moral hazard arising from food aid could undermine the viability of such contracts.
In identifying two types ofrisk, production risk and land value risk arising from soil depletion,
Innes and Ardila (1994) suggest an intenemporal environmental aspect to the incentive problem. For
fragile land, a contract tailored to insure against production risk may exacerbate land value
deterioration, and so onemight not be able to ignore dynamic aspects of moral hazard. This is
especially true if the operator does not own the land. Dynamic issues also arise in work by Coble et
al. (1997) who find evidence that input reduction by insured producers occurs mainly when a crop
loss is most likely, thus exacerbating themagnitude of the loss. Further empirical analysis is required
. - . I
to decompose the magnitudes of these impacts.
Moral hazard problems may not be confined to input intensity issues. If output is difficult to
verify, then false yields may be reported. Such illegal acts raise questions concerning contract
design, the structure of legal sanctions, and the nature of detection technologies. Hyde and
Vercammen (1997) argiie that, whereas it is difficult to motivate the structure oif insurance contracts
actually offered (i.e., the attributes of monotohicity, convexity, deductibility, and co-insurance) as a
response to moral hazard on input use alone, actual contracts can plausibly be an optimal response to
moral hazard on both input use and yield verification'together.
5.2.2. Adverse selection ' '' ' '
When, unlike the producer, the insurer is not completely informed about the nature of the risk being
insured, then the insurer faces the problem of adverse selection. Ignoring input choices, let a risk-
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neutral insurer have categorized three production units owned by different operators and ofequal size
(say, one acre without loss of generality), A, B, and C, into the same risk cohort. From the
information available to it, say common average yield (y), the insurer can observe no difference
among these three acres. In fact, the associated yield distributions differ; suppose all acres realize
two outcomes, each with the same probability but the realizations for acre Aare {y- 10, 10},
those for Bare {y- 20,5 +20}, and those for Care {y - 30,y +30}. With unit price, if the
insurance payout equaled Max[y - y, 0], then the expected payouts for acres A, B, and Cwould be 5,
10, and 15, respectively. In such a case, assuming full panicipation, the actuarially fair premium for
a contract covering all three risks would be 10/acre. However, if the acre Aproducer is
insufficiently risk averse, then she may conclude that the loss ratio for acre A, at 5/10 = 'A. is too
low and may not insure the acre. If the insurer' continues to charge 10/acre when covering only acres
Band C, then an average loss of2V^/acre is incurred. On the other hand, if the premium is raised to
12V^/acre so that a loss is avoided, then acre Bmay not be insured. Thus, themarket may unravel in
stages.
Avoiding adverse selection may require the successful crop insurance program to identify,
acquire, and skillfully use data that discriminate among different risks. Although perhaps costly to
implement, such data management procedures may be crucial because, unless rates are perceived as
being acceptable, the market may collapse. The phenomenon of unravelling suggests that identifying
a sufficiently large number of relatively homogeneous risks is a prerequisite for a successful contract.
Useful discriminators would appear to include mean yield. Skees and Reed (1986) and Just and
Calvin (1993) have found evidence suggesting that yield variance may decrease with increased mean
yield, and so, even if the trigger insurance yield increases with mean yield, rates should probably be
lower for more productive acres. Goodwin (1994), studying Kansas crops (1981-90), finds the
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relationship between yield variability and mean yield to be tenuous and suggests that fam yield
histories be used to calculate yield variability;rather,than impute variability from historical mean,
yield. He also concludes that other factors, such as enterprise size, could be informative msettmg
premium rates. .
The degree of homogeneity required to sustain the contract depends upon, among other things,
the degree of risk aversion expressed by producers. The more risk averse the producers, the more
tolerant they will be of acniarially'unfair rates.-..In an'investigation of adverse selection in contracts
on com production. Goodwin (1993) studied county-level data for the ninety-nine Iowa counties over
the period 1985 to 1990 and found the elasticities ofacreage insured to expected payoff to be in the.
range of 0.3—0.7. At a farm level, these elasticities may be higher. Further, he found that counties
where the risk ofpayout is low are quite sensitive to the premium charged, so that an across-the-state
(of Iowa) premium increase might not make com yield insurance more profitable because substantial
cancellations by the better risk prospects may occur. He concluded that the best approach to loss
ratio reduction may involve fme-tuning the rate setting at the county or farm level.
Adverse selection may be either spatial or temporal in nature. The problem type djscussed thus
far may be categorized as being spatial in the sense that the factors differentiating risks occur at a
given point in time. An alternative form of adverse selection, identified by Luo^ Skees and Marchant
(1994), may arise when attributes ofa given risk-vary temporally.'*^ Coble et al. (1996). consider
the case of adverse selection in crop insurance contracts for Kansas dryland wheat farmers over the
years 1987 to 1990. Pre-season rainfall was used as an indicator for intertemporal adverse selection
whereby an unseasonably low (high) level of rainfall, occurring before contract signing would entice
If the producer' is better informed about the temporal evolution of risk, then adverse selection may
occur. However, as discussed in Knight and Coble (1997), the insurer may be just as informed about
the temporal risk as the producer, but may be either unable or unwilling to adjust rates. In such a
situation, the problem is not one of adverse selection.
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marginal risks into (out of) signing, thus increasing the loss ratio if rates do not reflect the
inq)lications of the water deficit prevailing at signing. Although finding some evidence of adverse
selection, they did not identify any of an intertemporal nanire.
There are, of course, many factors other than adverse selection that determine the decision for,
and the magnitude of, crop insurance participation. To understand adverse,selection it is necessary to
isolate its impact by accounting for other determinants of participation. In addition to the
aforementioned research, econometric analyses of the determinants of insurance participation have
been conducted by Gardner and Kramer (1986), Just and Calvin (1990), and Smith and Baquet
(1996), among others. Although the conclusions are somewhat mixed, an overview of results
suggests that panicipation tends to increase with farm size. This may be because of the negative
correlation between farm size and the importance of off-farm income, or because of increased
borrowing. Also, enterprise specialization tends to increase participation, presumably because of
increased risk exposure. Further, and suggestive of adverse selection, higher yield variability land is
more likely to be insured. However, estimates by Coble et al. (1996) infer that this is true even if
rates account for the increased riskiness.
5.2.3. Further discussion
Though conceptually distinct, the differences between the moral hazard and adverse selection
problems often disappear in practice. Noting that both moral hazard and adverse selection are
problems of information asymmetry, Quiggin, Karagiannis and Stanton (1993) posed the situation in
which awheat and corn producer contemplating crop insurance has one acre of good land and one
acre ofbad land. Given the decision to insure wheat but not corn, the planting ofwheat on poor
quality land might be viewed as moral hazard. However, given the decision to plant poor land to
wheat, the decision to insure wheat only may be viewed as adverse selection. Thus, it should be no
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surprise that the potential remedies to each problem are smular.
Due to the informational nature of the main barriers to successfiii crop.insurance markets, the
obvious solution is, where feasible, to acquire and use as much information as marginal cost and .
profit considerations allow. To improve performance by reducing adverse selection, the FCIC
changed its approach to rate setting in 1985.to accommodate additional information. Subsequent
contracts changed the determination of the insurable yield from an average of past yields observed in
alocality to an average of past yields observed on the farm, in question. Even so .sensible areform,
however, may give rise to incentive problems.- As pointed put by Vercammen and van Kooten
(1994), producers might manipulate input use in.a cyclical mamer to build up insurable yield levels
before ra.hing in (in aprobabilistic sense) by reducing input use for afew years. „
On the other hand, area yield insurance [Halcrow (1949); Miranda (1991); Mahul (1999)], where
indemnities are based upon the average yield of asuitably wide area (say, acounty), eliminates the
moral hazard problem and may reduce or eliminate adverse selection. In addition, just as futures „
markets permit hedge ratios in excess of one, aproducer may take out an arbitrary level of area yield
insurance coverage without giving rise to.concems about increased moral hazard. Area yield
insurance rates are likely to be lower than farm-specific rates because an area yield index will usually
be less variable than yield on agiven farm. However, because farm-specific risks are not insured,
producers may continue to be subjected to some (possibly substantial) production risk.
Revenue insurance is a recurrently popular concept because it directly addresses the real problems
facing producers, namely income variability. Afurther possible advantage is that,.in combining price
and yield insurance, the approach may mitigate somewhat the incidence of moral hazard and adverse
selection, Miranda and Glauber (1991), as well as Babcock and Hennessy (1996), conducted
simulation analyses for U.S; crop production, and Turvey (1992a, 1992b) studied the costs and
benefits of such a program in Canada. -The potential for revenue ii^urance arises from the fact that.
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even together, price contingent markets (for afixed quantity) and yield contingent markets (for a
fixed price) are not likely to fully stabilize income. Hennessy, Babcock and Hayes (1997) have
shown that this targeting attribute of revenue insurance means that it can increase the welfare impact
of agiven expenditure on income suppon relative to various alternatives of price and yield suppon.
Compulsory insurance has often been proposed to diminate the political need for continual ex-
post interventions. If adverse selection is amajor problem in competitive insurance markets,
however, then compulsory insurance is unlikely to gain the political support necessary for a long-term
solution. More effective re-insurance on the part ofcrop insurers may facilitate the reduction of
market rates, and thus reduce adverse selection, because systemic risk is pervasive in the insurance of
crop risks and so pooling is largely ineffective for the insurer [Miranda and Glauber (1997); Duncan
and Myers (1997)]. Given the diminishing importance of agriculture in developed economies, the
introduction of crop loss risks into awell-diversified portfolio of risks would reduce the high level of
systematic risk in crop insurance markets, and so may reduce the risk premia required by crop
insurers. But crop insurance differs in many ways from other forms ofinsurance, and it may prove
difficult to entice reinsurers into accepting these contracts. If a permanent solution exists that is
politically more acceptable than a laissez-faire market approach, it may involve apackage of reforms
that is balanced to mitigate the incentive impacts but incurs low budgetary costs. Such a package,
should also take care not to undermine existing or potentially viable risk markets. Finally, the policy
mix must be flexible because the technology and organization ofcrop production may undergo
fundamental changes in the coming years.
6. Conclusion
It is abundantly clear that considerations of uncertainty and risk cannot be escaped when addressing
most agricultural economics problems. The demands imposed on economic analysis are complex and
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wide-ranging, with issues that extend from the pure theory of rational behavior to the practicality of
developing risk-maiiagement advice. The economics profession at large, and. its agricultural
economics subset; has responded to this challenge.with a wealth ofcontributions., In this chapte^ we
have en^hasized'theoretical and applieid analyses as they pertain to production decision at the farm
level. The EU model provides the most common approach.to characterizing rational decisions imder
risk, and it Kas been the framework ofchoice.for most applied work,in agricultural.economics.
Whereas our review has provided only a nutshell exposition of the framework s main features, the
careful shident will dig deeper-into its axiomatic underpinning,as.a crucial step to. appreciating what
modeling decisions under risk means. 'More^generally, we can note that a satisfactoty,model of
decision making urider'risk requires'assuming anextended notion ;pfrationality. Agents need to know
the entire distribution of risky variables,'arid need >to-take into accounthow this randomness affect
the distribution of outcomes over-alternative courses of action. - Thus, the decisionmaker's problem is
inherentlymore difficult under uncertainty than iinder certainty. • r
Because the notion of rational behavior under risk arguably requiresjagents to solve.a coinplex
problem, it is perhaps useful to distinguish between whether our. models are.meant to proyide a
positive theory (aiming to describe how agents actually make decisions under ns)C) .ox^ .normative
theory (the purpose of which is to prescribe a rational course of actiori for the particular risky
situation). This distinction'is* admittedly somewhat artificial, and most models are suitable to either
interpretation. Yet being more explicit-about whether one's analysis is pursuing a positive or ,
normative exercisc is possibly quite important in-applied contexts such as those cpvered in this
chapter." Much agriculturalriskmanagement work.is meant,as a normative,activity, and,this may
have implications for'the-choice of models .r For .instance;, the EU model has been criticized, on
positive grounds, for failing to describe accurately how agents actually, behave-under risk in some
situations; such a critique; of course; says :nothing, about the suitability of.the EUmodel for normative
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(prescriptive) purposes.
Models of decision making under risk bring to the forefront the fact that decisions will be affected
in acrucial way by the agent's preferences, i.e.. her attitudes towards risk. Consequently, it is quite
important to quantify the degree of agriculmral producers' risk aversion, and anumber of studies
have endeavored to do just that. The conclusions may be summarized as follows: within the EU
framework, producers typically display some aversion to risk, and risk preferences probably conform
to DARA. But evidence on the magnitude ofrisk aversion is less conclusive and falls short of
providing useful parameters that are critical for normative statements (whether in terms of risk
management advice to farmers or in terms of suggesting desirable government policies).
Considerations of risk aversion also raise concerns about a very common attribute ofapplied
studies that have apositive orientation. Namely,'whereas theoretical models are meant for individual
decision making, empirical models are often implemented With aggregate data. The danger of
ignoring the implicit aggregation problem is obviously ageneral concern that applies to economic
models of certainty as well. But the fact that risk attitudes play an important role in models with risk,
and given that such preferences are inherently an individual attribute, suggests that agents
heterogeneity is bound to be more important when risk matters. It seems that more can and should be
done to tackle aggregation considerations in a satisfactory manner.
The complexities of the decision maker's problem under risk raise additional issues for the
applied researcher. Agents' beliefs about the characteristics of uncertainty are obviously crucial m
this context- The EU model, by relying on the notion of subjective probabilities, neatly solves the
theoretical modeling question. But the applied researcher may need to model explicitly how the agent
makes probability assessments (i.e., to model her expectations). Whereas the rational expectation
hypothesis provides perhaps the most ambitious answer to this question, it is informationally very
demanding when (as is typically the case in risky simations) the entire distribution of the random
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variables maners. This raises the question ofwhether rational expectations are legitimate from a
theoretical point of view, but also in^lies that empirical models that wish to implement rational
expectations can be computationally quite demanding, even for the simplest model under risk.
Indeed, many empirical modds reviewed in this chapter appear somewhat oversimplified. The modus
operand! seems to be to allow theoretical modeling to be as sophisticated as-desired but to keep
empirical models as simple aspossible. Such oversimplifications naturally beg the question of the
relationship of empirical models to the theoretical constructs that are used to interpret results, and
raise some concerns about what exactly we can learn from this body of empirical smdies.
Notwithstanding the remaining criticisms and concerns that one may have, the studies surveyed in
this chapter have addressed an important set of problems. Uncertainty and risk are essential features
of many agriculwral activities, and have important consequences for the agents involved and for
society at large. Although welfare and policy considerations related to risk are discussed elsewhere in
this Handbook, we should note that the economic implications of the existence of risk and uncertainty
are related to the particular institutional setting in which agents operate. Insofar as the set of relevant
markets is not complete, then this market failure has the potential of adversely affecting resource
allocation, as well as resulting in less than optimal allocation of risk-bearing. Indeed, the
incompleteness of riskmarkets for agricultural producers has often been cited^as a motivation for
agricultural policies in many developed countries. But arguably neither existing markets nor
government policies have solved the farmers' risk exposure problems, and risk continues to have the
potential ofadversely affecting farmers' welfare, as well as carrying implications for the long-run
organization ofagricultural production and for the structure of resource ownership in the agricultural
sector.
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